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ABSTRACT 
 
Jennifer Kirstin Benz: Understanding Self-Interest: A Concept Bridging the Gap between Psychology 
and Politics 
(Under the direction of Thomas M Carsey) 
 
 
Self-interest is a concept germane to many theories in economics, political science, and 
psychology.  Although somewhat obscured by different terminology, such as vested interest or 
personal relevance, the function of self-interest as a motivating force for individuals is prominent in 
some of the most widely discussed and contested social science theories of this generation.  While 
many of these theories assume self-interest as a prime motivator of individual thought and behavior, 
other theories challenge that notion directly.  Furthermore, empirical evidence can be readily cited to 
support both positions.  Evidence in social psychology research supports the notion of self-interest as 
an important and relatively consistent force in the formation, structure, and expression of attitudes.  
However, a more disjointed body of empirical evidence in the political science literature finds self-
interest to be an inconsistent and relatively weak predictor of political and policy attitudes and 
behavior.   In this dissertation, I argue that the self-interest puzzle exists because political scientists 
have done a poor job of incorporating the psychology of self-interest into their theories while social 
psychologists have failed to appreciate the complexities of social contexts, like politics, into their 
theories.  I develop the Integrated Model of Self-Interest to overcome the theoretical and 
methodological differences between the two disciplines and provide a theoretical framework for 
understanding the conditional effects of self-interest within the dynamic political context.  Through 
analysis of public opinion data and survey-based experiments, I find that the realities of the political 
context condition the effects of self-interest seen in the psychological literature, but important indirect 
effects are realized at the individual and aggregate levels.  The findings have implications for several 
important political processes such as the representation of interests, the translation of public opinion 
into public policy, and political participation.    
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Paper 1: An Integrated Model of Self-Interest in Policy Attitude Formation 
   
The function of self-interest in political behavior is regularly debated in both the normative 
and empirical literatures.  One important puzzle is the discrepancy between the significant role of self-
interest in the economic, public policy and normative political literatures and its insubstantial role in 
the political public opinion literature.   The public opinion literature has generated two widely cited 
theories in which an individual’s symbolic beliefs and perceptions of the larger national situation are 
more predictive than self-interest for determining policy and electoral preferences.  Empirical tests 
generate support for both of these theories, but the accumulated body of evidence demonstrates that 
the theories are conditional upon individual and contextual factors.  The result is an unclear 
understanding of the basic structure of public policy attitudes.  In this paper, I develop the Integrated 
Model of Self-Interest to explain the determinants of public policy attitudes.  Rather than viewing self-
interest, symbolic beliefs, and perceptions of the national situation as competing determinants of 
public policy attitudes, I present a model that integrates these factors and predicts how they interact 
in the political context during the process of attitude formation. Tests of the model show the direct and 
indirect effects of self-interest to be a significant determinant of policy attitudes when the policy 
outcomes and consequences are clear. 
Despite the theoretical disagreement about the determinants of public policy preferences, 
aggregate public opinion is a proven influence on the policy process in the United States.  A 
considerable body of evidence finds that the public’s preferences have important effects on electoral 
and public policy outcomes (Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson 
1999; Kelly 2005; Wlezien 1995).  Furthermore, public policy scholars and practitioners observe in 
real time the determinants of public opinion and their consequences on important public policy issues.  
The debate over health care reform provides a clear example.  Experts on health care reform policy 
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observe that individual self-interest has a large effect on the public’s preferences for large-scale 
change (Oberlander 2003; Blendon 2006).  Oberlander writes, “The insured are generally satisfied 
with their own medical care, even if they think poorly of the system as a whole.  Consequently, the 
well-insured are not a reliable constituency for change.  Indeed, any reform that threatens to alter 
their medical care arrangements is likely to provoke public opposition” (2003).   
Observations like this challenge conventional thinking in political science about the 
determinants of policy attitudes, and most especially, the role of self-interest.  The Integrated Model 
of Self-Interest I develop in this paper provides a way to reconcile the discrepancy between the 
observed effects of self-interest in the policy environment and the inability to find an effect of self-
interest in the political science literature.  I begin with a brief review of the literatures on symbolic 
beliefs and voting based on perceptions of the national economic situation, highlighting the role that 
self-interest plays in those theories.  I then present the Integrated Model of Self-Interest and discuss 
the expectations of the model for understanding attitudes toward public policy issues.  In the next 
section, I utilize individual level opinion data on preferences for policies expanding health care 
coverage from 1993 - 2010 to test aspects of the theory.  I conclude with a discussion of the results 
and their implications for the role of self-interest in politics.   
Sociotropic Perceptions 
Early theories of public opinion emphasized the role of self-interest as a major determinant of 
individual preferences.  Campbell et al. (1960) articulate a notion of public policy preferences as mere 
expressions of “primitive self-interest” (Campbell et al 1960).  Popkin et al. (1976) assert that the 
influence of economic conditions on electoral outcomes results from individuals basing their electoral 
decisions upon the tangible economic situations they face in their daily lives.  The self-interested 
motivations of these “pocketbook voters” served as a central theme in the work on the political 
economy of individuals for several years.  
 Kinder and Kiewiet conducted the first critical investigation of the pocketbook voter 
assumption (1981).  In doing so, they defined the “sociotropic voter” as an individual “influenced most 
of all by the nation’s economic condition” and not the condition of their own pocketbook (Kinder and 
Kiewiet 1981).  They argued that individuals develop rough evaluations of the nation’s economic 
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condition and place credit or blame on the incumbent government accordingly.  Furthermore, they 
showed that sociotropic perceptions are not simply expressions of ideological or partisan loyalties.  
They and others showed that sociotropic perceptions are more predictive of vote choice than 
pocketbook considerations (Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kinder 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988).      
 Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) expressed an agnostic belief about the motivation driving 
sociotropic effects.  They were clear that sociotropic politics did not necessarily imply a politics of 
altruism.  Sociotropic politics, they believed, could very well be a politics of indirect self-interest, but 
they were unable to adequately test for this possibility.  Several scholars have since taken up this 
issue and the evidence that has accumulated suggests that sociotropic politics are not indirect 
expressions of self-interest.  Evaluations of group fairness, social value commitments, and beliefs in 
economic individualism seem to moderate the role of self-interest and bolster the effect of sociotropic 
perceptions (Mutz and Mondak 1997; Funk 2000; Funk and Garcia-Monet 1997; Feldman 1982).     
Symbolic Politics 
At about the same time that the sociotropic politics literature began questioning the role of 
self-interest, work by Sears and his colleagues explored the relative contribution of self-interested 
motivations compared to symbolic beliefs about race1, political parties, and ideology in predicting 
policy preferences and political behaviors (Kinder and Sears 1981; Lau et al. 1978; Sears et al. 
1980).  Their studies found little or no effect of self-interest on policy preferences across a number of 
domains.  Even when self-interest effects were present, their explanatory power compared to 
symbolic beliefs was quite small.  A recent replication and update of the original work confirms the 
dominant role of symbolic beliefs (Lau and Heldman 2009). 
 Overall then, the bulk of the evidence from the sociotropic perceptions and symbolic beliefs 
literatures reduces self-interest to a negligible determinant of policy preferences.  However, several 
studies do find a role for self-interest when examining preferences for policies that offer clear benefits 
or costs (Sears and Citrin 1985; Dixon et al. 1991; Wolpert and Gimpel 1998; Bergen 2009).  
                                                 
1 Early work by Sears and colleagues on symbolic racism has been criticized for methodological 
problems such as construct validity and confounding the independent and dependent variables (see 
Sniderman and Tetlock 1986).  Work focusing on the symbolic politics of ideology and partisanship 
(Sears and Lau 1983; Lau and Heldman 2009) improves upon these methodological problems.  
However, the dependent variables often used in these analyses ask about preferences for vague 
policies and are unlikely to tap the concept of tangible self-interest investigated in this paper.     
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Furthermore, survey and laboratory based experiments demonstrate that priming self-interest can 
induce significant self-interest effects in policy preferences (Sears and Lau 1983; Chong et al. 2001).  
Taken together, these results suggest that theories of political attitude determinants should not be so 
quick to dismiss the role of self-interest.  The empirical data imply that the role of self-interest is 
conditional and the evidence to date implies that self-interest is most likely to have an impact on 
attitudes when an individual is aware of his or her self-interest and when the implications of the policy 
options for the individual are clear.  However the literature does not clearly articulate the mechanisms 
that underlie the conditional nature of self-interest.           
The Elaboration Likelihood Model  
The conditional nature of self-interest can potentially be explained using models of attitude 
formation available in the social psychology literature. Dual process theories of attitude formation 
provide an account of how attitudes can form under different processes, including those requiring 
more cognitive effort than the others.   Some of the more common models in the literature are the 
Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) model, the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM), 
and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Fazio 1990; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986).  Of these models, which offer distinct but related accounts of attitude formation and 
the consequences of attitudes, the ELM provides the clearest way to think about self-interest in 
regard to attitude formation in the political and policy context. The Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM) of persuasion is of particular relevance to understanding the roles of self-interest, sociotropic 
perceptions, and symbolic beliefs.  The Elaboration Likelihood Model puts forth two routes that 
individuals might take when forming an attitude (Petty and Cacioppo 1981).  Individuals who are both 
motivated and able to cognitively process information relevant to the attitude are likely to take the 
central route to forming attitudes, which involves more cognitive processing and leads to relatively 
accessible and stable attitudes (Petty et al. 1995).  These individuals are said to have high 
elaboration likelihood.   High elaboration indicates a process in which individuals carefully attend to 
issue messages, access relevant information from memory, elaborate upon the message using the 
information from memory, and form an attitude based on this analysis (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  
Research on the ELM finds that personal relevance, which occurs when an issue has significant 
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consequences for the individual, motivates individuals to engage in central route processing (Petty 
and Cacioppo 1979).  Individuals lacking the motivation or ability to process information are likely to 
take the peripheral route to forming an attitude, such that they rely on simple cues and heuristics 
rather than cognitive processing.  These individuals are said to have low elaboration likelihood as 
they do not attend carefully to the message or undergo a process of accessing relevant information 
from memory.        
 There are several features of the Elaboration Likelihood Model that can lend insight into the 
conditional nature of self-interest observed in the political and policy context.  First, individuals who 
rely exclusively on cues or who engage fully in cognitive processing occupy the endpoints of the 
elaboration likelihood continuum.  Most individuals fall somewhere along the continuum such that 
they rely on both cognitive processing and cues to form their opinions (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).   
 Second, pieces of information and cues can serve multiple roles for individuals2.  A common 
example used in the literature is an ad that shows a picturesque view of a sandy beach.  In an 
advertisement for a hotel in Hawaii, this picture serves as relevant information for cognitive 
processing in the central route because it supplies information on the benefits of the hotel.  The same 
scene appearing in an advertisement for a car serves only as a peripheral cue because it does not 
provide any relevant information about the qualities of the car (Staats and Staats 1957).  In other 
words, a piece of information can serve as a cognitive argument or as a peripheral cue depending on 
the context.  
An Integrated Model of Self-Interest 
My objective is to apply these concepts from ELM to provide a theoretical understanding of 
the conditional nature of self-interest effects in politics. The Integrated Model of Self-Interest begins 
with the premise that the political environment provides individuals with a large amount of information 
they can use to form policy preferences.  Individuals can use each piece of information as either an 
informational argument or a peripheral cue (i.e. heuristic) depending on the degree to which an 
                                                 
2 In addition to serving as arguments or cues, a piece of information can also affect attitude formation 
by determining whether message processing occurs objectively or with a bias.  In biased processing, 
a piece of information can influence individuals to generate a specific type of thought, or to inhibit a 
specific type of thought (Petty and Cacioppo 1981).  Biased processing under the ELM shares many 
features with models of motivated reasoning (Lodge and Taber 2000).   
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individual is relying on cognitive processing to form their preferences. Included among the different 
types of information available are: 
 Arguments about the merits and consequences of policy options for different types of 
individuals.  These arguments connect policies with individual self-interest3. 
 Arguments about the merits and consequences of policy options for different groups.  These 
arguments connect policies with an individual’s social identifications4.   
 Endorsements of policy options by politicians and political parties.  These endorsements 
serve to connect the policy options to political affiliations, like parties.   
 Policy frames that connect the policy to broader ideological values, such as conservatism or 
equality5. 
Recall from the discussion of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) that individuals are 
likely to engage in cognitively oriented information processing, called central route processing, when 
they are able and motivated to think about the issue (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  In the realm of 
political decision-making, I propose that self-interest serves as a source of motivation that has 
consequences for information processing, attitudes, and behavior that are distinct from social 
identifications like party affiliation or values like ideology6.  Self-interest suggests that the policy issue 
carries significant consequences for the individual.  As self-interest increases, people will become 
more motivated to engage in the political environment.    
                                                 
3 Self-interest is defined as an individual’s material interests.  These material interests are not limited 
to monetary resources like tax refunds, but can also include resources like health insurance or local 
infrastructure improvements.   
 
4 Social identifications are defined as groups to which individuals consider themselves members or 
affiliates.  These identifications include objective memberships like race and gender, as well as 
subjective memberships like political parties. 
 
5 Values are defined as abstract beliefs about how a person should behave and the ideal outcomes 
he or she should achieve.  Some examples of values in the political realm include ideology and 
equality. 
 
6 Individuals can be motivated to use central route processing for several reasons.  In addition to the 
motivation of self-interest (i.e. personal relevance) discussed in this project, another well researched 
motivation is an individual’s need for cognition.  Individuals high in need for cognition (NFC) enjoy 
engaging in effortful and analytic thinking (Cacioppo and Petty 1982).  Need for cognition is an 
individual difference variable that is rarely measured in political surveys.  Although not a direct proxy 
for NFC (Cacioppo et al. 1996), an individual’s education is controlled for in all analyses presented 
here.     
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 The Integrated Model of Self-Interest generates two hypotheses about the conditional nature 
of self-interest in the political context.  First, the effects of self-interest are expected to be significant 
whenever the policy outcomes and consequences are clear. When a policy articulates clear benefits 
and costs, self-interested individuals will be motivated to hold attitudes aligned with their self-interest. 
Furthermore, the significant effect of self-interest should remain even when controlling for symbolic 
beliefs and sociotropic perceptions.  There are two features of the political context that are likely to 
dampen the observed effects of self-interest in the political context.  First, policies are presented to 
individuals in a political environment that often obfuscates policy details including messages about 
how a policy will affect different segments of the population.  The second feature is methodological.  
Public opinion surveys often use questions that measure self-interest in narrow terms, while 
measuring policy preferences broadly.  For example, many surveys measure personal health 
insurance status at a particular point in time and measure preferences for more or less government 
spending on health in the future.  The effect of broad government spending in a policy domain for an 
individual is unclear.  As such, self-interest effects are unlikely to be observed when indicators are 
measured at different levels of specificity7.    
 Second, self-interest should moderate the effects of sociotropic perceptions and symbolic 
beliefs.  Individuals with a self-interest in a policy will be more likely to cognitively engage in an issue 
and less likely to rely on cues in the political environment. Under this model the influence of self-
interest and sociotropic perceptions and symbolic beliefs to determine policy preferences will differ 
depending on the relevance of the policy issue for the individual. Individuals without a tangible 
interest in a policy will not be motivated to elaborate on the information available in the political 
environment and will therefore rely on symbolic beliefs and sociotropic perceptions as cues to form 
their attitudes.  As a result, the Integrated Model of Self-Interest expects significant differences based 
upon symbolic beliefs and sociotropic perceptions to exist among individuals without a tangible 
interest in the policy.  However, when an individual has a tangible stake in a policy, the model expects 
self-interest to moderate the influence of symbolic and sociotropic cues.   
                                                 
7 This measurement problem runs parallel to early research on the attitude-behavior connection, 
which found a much tighter correlation between expressed attitudes and behaviors when the two 
concepts were measured at similar levels of specificity (Ajzen and Fazio 1977). 
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Figure 1.1 depicts the relationship between self-interest and a symbolic belief, party 
identification, for a hypothetical policy8.  The first hypothesis of the Integrated Model of Self-Interest 
predicts that, overall, self-interested individuals will support the policy more than individuals without 
an interest.  Furthermore, the situation pictured is one in which self-interested individuals and 
Democrats tend to support the policy.  In this situation, the second hypothesis of the Integrated Model 
of Self-Interest predicts little or no significant difference among self-interested Democrats and 
Republicans and a significant difference between Democrats and Republicans without a self-interest 
in the policy.  Additionally, the nearly flat slope of the Democrats’ line predicted by the second 
hypothesis of the theory means that very little difference exists among Democrats regardless of self-
interest, but self-interested Republicans should differ from Republicans without an interest in the 
policy.  
Figure 1.1: Expected Interaction of Self-Interest and Symbolic Beliefs under the Integrated 
Model of Self-Interest 
 
For a policy in which self-interested individuals and Democrats are in support. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Party identification is regularly treated as a symbolic belief in the symbolic politics literature in that 
individuals tend to have reflexive affective responses to the parties (see Sears 2003 for a review of 
symbolic processing).  The Integrated Model of Self-Interest cannot arbitrate between alternative 
conceptions of party affiliation as a psychological identity (Campbell et al. 1960) or social identity 
(Green et al. 2002), as both would yield similar effects.  A concept of party affiliation as an 
instrumental tally (Fiorina 1981), is not likely to yield the same effect in the model.  Although the 
nature of partisanship is still open to debate, many scholars believe that each of these explanations is 
true for some individuals and not for others (Erikson et al. 2002).   
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Data and Methods 
In this paper, I test the expectations that self-interest will have an effect for policies with 
tangible individual outcomes, and, that self-interest will moderate the effects of sociotropic 
perceptions and symbolic beliefs using multivariate regression techniques with national survey data.  I 
use the health care reform case as an example of a policy with tangible policy consequences.   
The use of survey data requires the researcher to make a decision about the self-interest of 
an individual respondent or category of people.  My selection of health care reform, particularly 
policies aimed at expanding health care coverage and improving access, is intended to minimize the 
error associated with that judgment.  Being uninsured or underinsured in this country creates a 
number of tangible effects including fragmented health care, delayed treatments, failed detection of 
preventable diseases, and increased financial instability9.  Policies that guarantee health care 
coverage provide tangible benefits for the medically uninsured.   
At the same time, the provision of universal health care coverage invokes sociotropic and 
symbolic considerations as well.  Frequently the debate over reform includes sociotropic messages 
about the chance that the reform could lessen the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the system 
for the country.  Symbolic beliefs about reforms, especially those regarding universal coverage, are 
embodied in the rhetoric of big government that is consistently present in the elite debate over the 
policy.  Because health reform policies offer tangible benefits to the medically uninsured and under-
insured while simultaneously engaging political symbols and sociotropic perceptions, the policy 
provides a reasonable test of the Integrated Model of Self-Interest.  
To operationalize these concepts for testing the model, I utilize data from a variety of national 
surveys of adults about health care issues archived at the Roper Center10.  The surveys were fielded 
in 1993, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010. The time period of the surveys covers years when health 
reform was both at the top of the agenda (1993, 2009-2010) and when the policy was low on the 
                                                 
9 Reports from the Institute of Medicine develop and discuss these implications more fully.  Institute of 
Medicine (IOM). 2003. A Shared Destiny: Community Effects of Uninsurance. Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press See also, The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.  2009.  
Five Facts about the Uninsured.  Available at: http://www.kff.org/uninsured/7806.cfm, accessed June 
2010.   
 
10 Full citations and question wordings are included in the Appendix 1.A.   
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agenda (2004, 2006, and 2008).  The dependent variables in the analyses include several questions 
about support for various policies that expand coverage or access to health insurance for the 
uninsured and underinsured.  The surveys were selected because the questions ask for respondents’ 
attitudes on specific policies with clear implications for the uninsured and underinsured.   
Furthermore, because of the various time periods, the policy questions cover a variety of policies and 
popular phrases and terminologies (e.g., “government plan,” “mandate,” “universal coverage”). Self-
interest, the key independent variable, is operationalized as having some form of health insurance or 
health care coverage. Symbolic beliefs include self-identification as a Democrat or Republican. 
Sociotropic perceptions are operationalized as a question that asks respondents the degree to which 
they believe health reform will benefit the country as a whole. To reduce the risk of omitted variable 
bias, I include controls for education, gender, race, and income.  
To test the Integrated Model of Self-Interest’s second hypothesis that self-interest moderates 
symbolic beliefs and sociotropic perceptions, I form a series of interaction terms.  The first set is an 
interaction between health insurance status and the pair of party affiliation variables representing 
Democrats and Republicans.  The omitted baseline category is for non-partisans.  Party identification 
is selected as the symbolic belief because the parties have well known public stances on health care 
coverage reforms.  For example, Republicans most often view public insurance options as inefficient 
and prefer to find market based solutions that give individuals the tools needed to manage their own 
access and care such as tax incentives, while Democrats are more often associated with preferences 
for government interventions to extend coverage and improve access.  The second interaction term is 
between insurance status and the belief that health reform will benefit the country as a whole.  
Findings 
To test the Integrated Model of Self-Interest, I estimate a series of logit and ordered logit 
models with preferences for policies that expand insurance coverage and access as the dependent 
variable. Table 1 shows a traditional model from the symbolic politics or sociotropic perceptions 
literature to the Integrated Model of Self-Interest, which estimates the direct effects of self-interest 
and symbolic beliefs and/or sociotropic perceptions.  The dependent variables in these models are 
from 2006, 2009, and 2010 surveys and asks respondents for preferences on various insurance 
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coverage reforms.  In accordance with the Integrated Model of Self-Interest’s expectation that self-
interest is likely to affect attitudes when policies have tangible consequences for individuals, these 
particular survey questions provide a clear choice for uninsured individuals between a system that 
intends to cover all individuals through some policy mechanism and the current system in which they 
do not have coverage.   
 As shown in Table 1.1, the traditional model used in the symbolic politics and sociotropic 
perceptions literatures behaves as expected, overall, for the ten models estimated in the table.  
Looking at Model 1 from a 2006 survey as an example, the coefficients on the Democrat and liberal 
terms are significant and positive and the coefficients on the Republican and conservative terms are 
negative and significant coefficients as expected.  Joint Wald hypothesis tests confirm that Democrats 
and Republicans are significantly different from one another, as are liberals and conservatives11.  The 
significant and positive coefficient on the sociotropic perceptions term indicates that those individuals 
who consider the uninsured problem to be critical for the country as a whole are more likely to support 
universal coverage than those who do not think it is a critical problem.  Of note is the significant and 
negative sign on the insured term meaning that insured individuals are significantly less likely to 
prefer a system of universal health insurance even after controlling for symbolic beliefs and 
sociotropic perceptions.  Most models in the symbolic politics literature find that self-interest variables 
contribute very little compared to models including only symbolic belief variables (Lau and Heldman 
2009).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 The relevant Wald test statistics are: Democrats=Republicans (χ21df  = 37.35, p<.01) and 
liberals=conservatives (χ21df  = 18.18, p<.01). 
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Table 1.1: Traditional Model Comparing Self-Interest, Symbolic Politics, and Sociotropic 
Perceptions 
 (1) 2006 (2) 2009 (3) 2009 (4) 2009 (5) 2009 (6) 2009 (7) 2009 (8) 2009 (9) 2009 (10) 2010 
 
Preference 
for 
Universal 
Coverage 
Individual 
mandate 
Public 
option 
like 
Medicare 
Tax 
credits 
Expand 
Medicare 
Expand 
state 
programs 
Single 
payer 
plan 
Employer 
mandate 
Public 
option 
Support 
2010 
Cong 
reforms 
Insured -1.327*** 0.18 -0.55** -0.35* -0.49** -0.72* 0.047 -0.68** -0.74** -0.27* 
 (0.352) (0.22) (0.28) (0.26) (0.29) (0.38) (0.28) (0.33) (0.30) (0.23) 
           
Uninsured 
Problem for 
Country 
0.590*** 1.15*** 1.61*** 0.49*** 1.04*** 1.06*** 1.01*** 1.19*** 1.30*** 3.16*** 
 (0.112) (0.15) (0.22) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) 
           
Democrat 0.434** 0.64*** 0.36* 0.53*** 0.061 0.50** 0.22 0.58** 0.55*** 0.71*** 
 (0.190) (0.16) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) (0.20) 
           
Republican -0.821*** -0.022 -0.16 0.27 -0.44* -0.40* -0.73*** -0.16 -0.088 -0.70*** 
 (0.200) (0.20) (0.28) (0.25) (0.27) (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.19) 
           
Liberal 0.600*** 0.28* 0.42** 0.061 0.14 0.67** 0.32 0.56** 0.38* 0.20 
 (0.212) (0.19) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.33) (0.29) (0.26) (0.26) (0.22) 
           
Conservative -0.410** -0.29** -0.60*** 0.12 -0.14 0.021 -0.45** -0.25 -0.43** -0.47*** 
 (0.181) (0.17) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.19) 
           
Education 0.048 -0.012 0.027 -0.20** -0.078 -0.14 0.011 0.031 0.011 -0.033 
 (0.075) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) 
           
Age -0.006 -0.0026 -0.0096** -0.0062 -0.010** -0.0045 -0.0079 -0.011** -0.0021 0.0051 
 (0.005) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
           
White -0.092 -0.34** -0.33* -0.23 -0.36* -0.31 -0.38* 0.31 0.46** -0.44** 
 (0.204) (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) (0.22) (0.27) (0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (0.20) 
           
Income -0.093* 0.012 -0.028 0.048 -0.053 -0.13** -0.21*** -0.12** -0.013 -0.052* 
 (0.056) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
           
Female -0.106 0.50*** -0.28* 0.29* 0.31* 0.44** -0.25 0.38** 0.29* -0.14 
 (0.159) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.15) 
           
Constant 0.244          
 (0.641)          
           
Cut 1  -1.03*** -1.65*** -2.32*** -3.67*** -3.27*** -1.71*** -1.89*** -0.44 -0.37 
  (0.35) (0.42) (0.41) (0.47) (0.55) (0.49) (0.52) (0.50) (0.38) 
           
Cut 2  -0.13 -0.59* -1.30*** -2.28*** -2.49*** -0.57 -0.99** 0.35 0.71** 
  (0.36) (0.44) (0.42) (0.47) (0.54) (0.47) (0.52) (0.51) (0.36) 
           
Cut 3  1.30*** 0.89** 0.25 -0.78* -0.66 0.83** 0.80* 2.03*** 2.76*** 
  (0.37) (0.44) (0.42) (0.48) (0.55) (0.47) (0.54) (0.53) (0.41) 
N 917 1011 541 536 535 466 453 454 455 865 
Note: Table entries are ordered logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, one-tailed test 
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The coefficient on the insurance status term shows a significant, negative relationship of 
being insured to preferring a system of universal health insurance over the current system.  This is 
true for eight of the ten models.  Figure 1.2 demonstrates the effect of insurance status on 
preferences for universal coverage in the traditional model of symbolic politics or sociotropic 
perceptions shown in Table 1.1.  The predicted probability of supporting universal coverage for 
insured individuals is .56 (95% CI: 0.53, 0.60) and .83 (95% CI: 0.74, 0.92) for uninsured 
individuals12.  This represents a nearly 30 percentage point increase in support as individuals move 
from being insured to being uninsured.  These results provide support for the Integrated Model of 
Self-Interest’s expectation that self-interest will have an effect on policy attitudes when the policy has 
tangible consequences.        
Figure 1.2: Predicted Probability of Support for Universal Coverage Given Insurance Status  
 
Note: Predicted probabilities generated using Model 1 from Table 1.1.  All other variables are held at 
their mean or modal value.   
 
The significant effect of self-interest in the traditional symbolic politics and sociotropic 
perceptions model is due to the characteristics of the policy option being considered.  First, the policy 
provides a tangible policy outcome for the uninsured.  Second, it provides a clear contrast to the 
current system which is not meeting the needs of the uninsured and is therefore likely to activate self-
interest.  The Integrated Model of Self-Interest specifies that these types of characteristics, which 
                                                 
12 All other variables are set to their mean or modal values.   
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exemplify the idea of tangible policy consequences, are necessary to activate self-interest.  These 
features are often lacking in the policy options used in traditional models of symbolic politics and 
sociotropic perceptions.       
Of central interest in evaluating the Integrated Model of Self-Interest is whether or not the 
effects of symbolic beliefs and sociotropic perceptions are moderated by self-interest.  A moderated 
effect will provide evidence for the model’s hypothesis that self-interest has the effect of lessening 
individuals’ reliance on peripheral cues like party identification.  For the case of expanding health care 
coverage, the expectation of the Integrated Model of Self-Interest, as depicted in Figure 1.1, is that 
Democrats will have similar preferences for universal coverage regardless of insurance status, while 
insured Republicans should express less support for universal coverage compared to uninsured 
Republicans and all Democrats.   
The data to evaluate these hypotheses are presented in Tables 1.2 and 1.3.  These tables 
use the Integrated Model of Self-Interest to predict support for several different types of health care 
coverage policies between 1993 and 2010.  The expected negative and significant coefficient on the 
insurance status and Republican term is significant in nine of the thirteen models.  Also as expected, 
the coefficient on the insurance status and Democrat interaction terms are not distinguishable from 
zero in all but one case.  Furthermore, the negative coefficient on the insurance status term, which is 
significant in six of the models, indicates that insured non-partisans are less likely to support policies 
to expand coverage.      
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Table 1.2:  Preferences for Expanded Coverage Policies (1993-2008) Given Insurance Status 
and Symbolic Beliefs 
 
 (1) 1993 (2) 2004 (3) 2006 (4) 2008 
 
Preference for expanded 
coverage over cost 
control policy 
Repeal tax cuts 
to expand 
coverage 
Preference for universal 
coverage over current 
system 
Preference for universal 
coverage over current 
system 
Insured -0.70** -0.080 -.996** -0.564* 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.523) (0.304) 
     
Democrat 0.64 0.98** 0.370 -0.300 
 (0.50) (0.47) (0.694) (0.544) 
     
Republican 0.42 -0.064 0.226 -0.604 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.821) (0.633) 
     
Insured*Democrat -0.35 -0.51 0.131 0.992 
 (0.54) (0.51) (0.718) (0.751) 
     
Insured*Republican -0.68* -0.82* -1.266** -0.712* 
 (0.51) (0.52) (0.739) (0.401) 
     
Liberal  0.16 0.607*** 0.644*** 
  (0.22) (0.208) (0.222) 
     
Conservative  -0.66*** -0.546*** -0.851*** 
  (0.19) (0.175) (0.196) 
     
Education 0.025 0.037 0.035 0.052 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.073) (0.061) 
     
Age -0.0080** 0.17** -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.08) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Income -0.17*** -0.086 -0.091** -0.176*** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.549) (0.061) 
     
White -1.00*** -0.36* -0.121 -0.263 
 (0.26) (0.22) (0.201) (0.241) 
     
Female -0.072 0.42*** .062 -0.153 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.153) (0.165) 
     
Constant 2.07***  1.971*** 1.594*** 
 (0.51)  (0.614) (0.562) 
     
Cut 1  -0.65*   
  (0.45)   
     
Cut 2  0.98**   
  (0.45)   
N 818 571 917 842 
Note: Table entries are logit or ordered logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, one-tailed test
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Table 1.3:  Preferences for Expanded Coverage Policies (2009-2010) Given Insurance Status 
and Symbolic Beliefs 
 (1) 2009 (2) 2009 (3) 2009 (4) 2009 (5) 2009 (6) 2009 (7) 2009 (8) 2009 (9) 2010 
 Individual mandate 
Public 
option like 
Medicare 
Tax credits Expand Medicare 
Expand 
state 
programs 
Single 
payer plan 
Employer 
mandate 
Public 
option 
Support 
2010 Cong 
reforms 
Insured 0.079 -0.64* 0.18 -0.32 -0.64 -0.81** -0.33 -0.69** -0.071 
 (0.27) (0.40) (0.33) (0.36) (0.56) (0.43) (0.44) (0.41) (0.28) 
          
Democrat 0.65** -0.022 1.35*** 0.35 0.64 -0.41 0.65 0.11 1.12*** 
 (0.34) (0.43) (0.45) (0.51) (0.72) (0.50) (0.55) (0.46) (0.18) 
          
Republican 0.79 -0.30 1.33** 0.39 -1.47* -2.08** 1.95** 0.074 -1.11*** 
 (0.67) (0.85) (0.66) (0.74) (0.98) (0.92) (0.92) (0.49) (0.20) 
          
Insured* 0.24 0.79 -0.90** -0.12 0.043 1.01 0.14 0.77 0.25 
Democrat (0.38) (0.49) (0.51) (0.55) (0.76) (0.56) (0.60) (0.52) (0.54) 
          
Insured* -1.11* -0.19 -1.38** -1.18* 1.05 1.40 -2.42*** -0.36 -0.61* 
Republican (0.70) (0.91) (0.69) (0.80) (1.03) (0.97) (0.99) (0.57) (0.45) 
          
Liberal 0.41** 0.62*** 0.078 0.23 0.85*** 0.44* 0.73*** 0.68*** 0.33 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.32) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.50) 
          
Conserv- -0.43*** -0.78*** 0.0064 -0.30* -0.16 -0.58** -0.43* -0.61*** -0.30 
ative (0.17) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.24) (0.41) 
          
Education 0.014 0.11 -0.17* -0.032 -0.10 0.051 0.027 0.049 -0.033 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) 
          
Age -0.0029 -0.0092* -0.0055 -0.0091* -0.0032 -0.0084 -0.0076 -0.0023 -0.0017 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
          
Income 0.018 -0.021 0.055 -0.045 -0.13** -0.19*** -0.11** -0.036 -0.025 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
          
White -0.36** -0.33* -0.26 -0.37** -0.42* -0.42** 0.11 0.31* -0.63*** 
 (0.16) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.19) 
          
Female 0.51*** -0.28* 0.30** 0.32** 0.43** -0.20 0.41** 0.29* -0.29** 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.15) 
          
Cut 1 -1.54*** -2.40*** -2.04*** -3.78*** -3.87*** -2.76*** -2.33*** -1.41*** -1.84*** 
 (0.35) (0.50) (0.44) (0.51) (0.67) (0.59) (0.57) (0.55) (0.39) 
          
Cut 2 -0.69** -1.44*** -1.02** -2.42*** -3.12*** -1.66*** -1.47*** -0.68 -1.11*** 
 (0.36) (0.50) (0.45) (0.50) (0.64) (0.57) (0.57) (0.55) (0.38) 
          
Cut 3 0.68** -0.12 0.52 -0.98** -1.36** -0.30 0.23 0.88* 0.24 
 (0.37) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.65) (0.56) (0.57) (0.56) (0.38) 
N 1011 541 536 535 466 453 454 455 865 
Note: Table entries are ordered logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, one-tailed test 
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To help with interpretation, predicted probabilities for the interaction effect are presented in 
Figure 1.3.  Again, as in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1, the 2006 survey that asks respondents to choose 
between the current system and a system of universal insurance is used to illustrate the effect.  The 
data are included in Table 1.2 as Model 3.  Looking at Figure 1.3, there are two important features to 
notice.  First, there are no significant differences in preferences by party for self-interested individuals 
with a tangible stake in the policy outcome.  The probability of preferring universal coverage to the 
current system is statistically the same for uninsured Democrats is (.86, 95% CI: .74, .98) and 
uninsured Republicans (.84, 95% CI: .67, .99) 13.  Second, insured Republicans, whose probability of 
supporting universal coverage is .35 (95% CI: .27, .44), are significantly different from uninsured 
Republicans and all Democrats. The probability of preferring universal coverage to the current system 
is .72 (95% CI: .65, .78) for insured Democrats, which is significantly lower than uninsured 
Democrats.  These results provide support for the idea that self-interest lessens individuals’ reliance 
on symbolic cues in the political environment.  
Figure 1.3:  Predicted Probability of Support for Universal Coverage Given Insurance Status & 
Party Affiliation 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities generated using the Integrated Model of Self-Interest from Table 1.2, 
Model 3.  All other variables are held at their mean or modal value.   
 
  
                                                 
13 Predicted probabilities are calculated by setting the insured, party identification, and interactions 
terms to one or zero as appropriate.  The remaining variables are set to their modal or mean value.   
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The Integrated Model of Self-Interest also predicts that self-interest should moderate the 
effects of sociotropic perceptions.  The data for this expectation are presented in Table 1.4 and 
provide mixed evidence14.  The interaction term between insurance status and perceptions that health 
reform will benefit the country as a whole is only significant in two of the nine models.  Figure 1.4 
depicts the predicted probabilities for Model 1.  The dependent variable in this model is support for a 
mandate that all Americans have health insurance with financial assistance for those who cannot 
afford it.  As seen in Figure 4, the influence of sociotropic perceptions is lessened for uninsured 
individuals.  The proportion of uninsured respondents who oppose and support the individual 
mandate is the same regardless of perceptions of how the policy will benefit the country as a whole.  
Among the insured, respondents who believe the individual mandate will benefit the country as a 
whole are more likely to support the policy compared to those respondents who believe the policy will 
not benefit the country.  Although the finding of self-interest lessening the influence of sociotropic 
perceptions is as expected under the Integrated Model of Self-Interest in this case, the effect is not 
consistently significant.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Although the 2006 Kaiser survey did include an indicator of sociotropic perceptions, the interaction 
could not be tested.  In this case, the effect appears so strong that there was not enough variation in 
perceptions among the uninsured.  Nearly 95 percent of the uninsured in that survey considered the 
current insurance system to be a critical or serious problem for the country.  Similarly, a model that 
includes the insurance and symbolic beliefs, and, insurance and sociotropic perceptions interaction 
terms cannot be estimated due to a high proportion of perfectly predicted cases.   
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Table 1.4:  Preferences for Expanded Coverage Policies (2009-2010) Given Insurance Status 
and Sociotropic Perceptions 
 
 (1) 2009 (2) 2009 (3) 2009 (4) 2009 (5) 2009 (6) 2009 (7) 2009 (8) 2009 (9) 2010 
 Individual mandate 
Public 
option like 
Medicare 
Tax credits Expand Medicare 
Expand 
state 
programs 
Single 
payer plan 
Employer 
mandate 
Public 
option 
Support 
2010 Cong 
reforms 
Insured -0.72** -0.35 -0.51* -0.74** -0.49 -0.19 -0.57 -1.00** -0.085 
 (0.37) (0.43) (0.37) (0.43) (0.60) (0.51) (0.55) (0.45) (0.31) 
          
Democrat 0.66*** 0.36* 0.53*** 0.057 0.49** 0.21 0.58** 0.54*** 0.71*** 
 (0.16) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) (0.20) 
          
Republican -0.017 -0.16 0.27 -0.43* -0.41* -0.73*** -0.15 -0.082 -0.70*** 
 (0.20) (0.28) (0.25) (0.27) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27) (0.19) 
          
Sociotropic -0.029 1.39*** 0.27 0.66* 0.82 0.73* 0.86* 0.47 3.07*** 
 (0.39) (0.47) (0.43) (0.50) (0.70) (0.56) (0.65) (0.47) (0.43) 
          
Sociotropic*  1.44*** 0.27 0.27 0.47 0.28 0.34 0.39 1.01** 0.12 
Insurance (0.42) (0.50) (0.47) (0.54) (0.74) (0.59) (0.67) (0.53) (0.42) 
          
Liberal 0.26* 0.40** 0.046 0.12 0.68** 0.32 0.56** 0.39* 0.20 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.33) (0.29) (0.26) (0.26) (0.22) 
          
Conserv- -0.27* -0.60*** 0.12 -0.14 0.026 -0.45** -0.24 -0.44** -0.47*** 
ative (0.17) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.19) 
          
Education -0.013 0.029 -0.19** -0.077 -0.14 0.011 0.030 0.016 -0.033 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) 
          
Age -0.0021 -0.0096** -0.0063 -0.010** -0.0042 -0.0074 -0.011* 0.00025 0.0051 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
          
Income 0.015 -0.027 0.049 -0.052 -0.13** -0.21*** -0.11** -0.011 -0.053* 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
          
White -0.34** -0.33* -0.23 -0.35* -0.33 -0.39* 0.29 0.41* -0.44** 
 (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) (0.22) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25) (0.20) 
          
Female 0.48*** -0.28* 0.29* 0.31* 0.44** -0.25 0.37** 0.28* -0.14 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.15) 
          
Cut 1 -1.79*** -1.77*** -2.45*** -3.89*** -3.40*** -1.92*** -2.10*** -0.93** -0.43 
 (0.42) (0.46) (0.45) (0.54) (0.71) (0.60) (0.66) (0.53) (0.44) 
          
Cut 2 -0.89** -0.71* -1.42*** -2.50*** -2.63*** -0.77* -1.20** -0.13 0.65* 
 (0.43) (0.48) (0.45) (0.53) (0.70) (0.59) (0.67) (0.53) (0.43) 
          
Cut 3 0.57* 0.77* 0.12 -0.99** -0.79 0.63 0.59 1.56*** 2.69*** 
 (0.43) (0.49) (0.45) (0.54) (0.71) (0.59) (0.67) (0.53) (0.47) 
N 1011 541 536 535 466 453 454 455 865 
Note: Table entries are ordered logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, one-tailed test 
 
 
20 
 
Figure 1.4:  Predicted Probability of Support for Universal Coverage Given Insurance Status & 
Sociotropic Perceptions 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities generated using the Integrated Model of Self-Interest from Table 1.4, 
Model 1.  All other variables are held at their mean or modal value.   
 
Discussion 
The results presented in the case of universal health insurance provide support for the 
Integrated Model of Self-Interest.  The theory generates three predictions.  First, the effects of self-
interest on policy attitudes will be significant when the consequences and benefits of the policy are 
clear.  The results support the hypothesis.  The provision of expanded health care coverage and 
improved access provides a tangible benefit to those individuals without health insurance.  Individuals 
currently lacking health insurance, those with a tangible interest in the policy, were significantly more 
likely to support the policy.  This effect persisted even when symbolic beliefs, such as party affiliation 
and ideology, and sociotropic perceptions of the uninsured problem were controlled for in the model.  
The significant effect of self-interest found in this analysis differs from the results found in much of the 
symbolic politics literature.  According to the Integrated Model of Self-Interest, this discrepancy is 
explained by differences in the policy options under consideration.  In the present study, the 
dependent variables provide a policy option that clearly describes a new system of health care in 
which all individuals have some form of health insurance.  This policy option poses tangible benefits 
for the uninsured.  Often, the dependent variable in the symbolic politics and sociotropic perceptions 
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literature lacks these same characteristics.  Under those conditions, when tangible policy effects are 
not clear to respondents, the Integrated Model of Self-Interest would not predict significant effects for 
self-interest.      
 Second, the Integrated Model of Self-Interest predicts that self-interest will moderate the 
effects of symbolic beliefs and sociotropic perceptions.  The results presented here for the case of 
health care coverage and access preferences demonstrate significant differences between individuals 
without an interest in the policy based on party affiliation, and no such differences between those 
individuals with an interest in the policy.  As expected, the uninsured were equally as likely to support 
health coverage policies regardless of party affiliation.  The Integrated Model of Self-Interest posits 
that the uninsured are motivated to centrally process information in the political environment.  The 
data presented above provide evidence for the idea that Republicans without insurance relied less on 
party message cues and formed attitudes in support of expanded health care coverage.  
Furthermore, the insured, those without a tangible interest in the policy, showed significant 
differences in support for universal coverage by party affiliation.  This suggests that party messages 
were processed peripherally as cues rather than elaborated upon centrally as arguments.  Although 
correlational in nature, these results provide support for the Integrated Model of Self-Interest’s 
prediction that self-interest motivates individuals to centrally process political information, while those 
without an interest are likely to accept the symbolic political information as a peripheral cue.          
 Similarly, the Integrated Model of Self-Interest also predicts that self-interest will moderate 
the influence of sociotropic perceptions on policy attitudes.  The evidence of this effect of self-interest 
was weaker in the case of expanded health coverage policies.  Insurance status significantly 
moderated the influence of respondents’ perceptions that health reform would be good for the country 
in a minority of the models presented.  In the few cases where the effect was significant, the results 
demonstrated the expected relationship.  Uninsured individuals’ support for expanded health 
coverage policies were equal regardless of their views about the effect of reform for the country as a 
whole.  Insured individuals’ support for the policies differed significantly according to their perceptions 
of how health reform would affect the country.   
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Conclusions   
The Integrated Model of Self-Interest provides a new way of conceiving the role of self-
interest in politics.  Self-interest serves to motivate individuals to carefully process the information 
they receive from the political environment to form policy attitudes rather than simply relying on 
symbolic cues or perceptions of the national situation.  The Integrated Model of Self-Interest provides 
insights into understanding the determinants of public policy attitudes.  In the aggregate, these 
attitudes function as inputs in the public policy process and serve as predictors of policy outcomes 
(Erikson et al. 2002).   
Additionally, the Integrated Model of Self-Interest may have implications for political behavior.  
The attitudes formed by self-interested individuals are predicted to be strong and therefore more 
predictive of behavior.  Scholars have begun to explore the idea that self-interest may have more of a 
political impact in terms of behavior than attitudes (William and Ratner 1998; Green and Cowden 
1992).  The Integrated Model of Self-Interest would provide a theoretical rationale for these 
predictions. The model would predict that policy attitudes formed by self-interested individuals 
demonstrate the attributes of all attitudes formed using central route processing such as persistence, 
certainty, and improved likelihood to predict behavior.  The data utilized for testing the hypotheses in 
this study are not capable of evaluating this expectation of the theory.  Future experimental work will 
be needed to compare the characteristics of attitudes resulting from individuals lacking self-interest 
and those with self-interest in a public policy.  Testing the behavioral impact of the theory would 
provide an even greater understanding of the subtle, but significant, role that self-interest plays in 
politics.         
 
 
  
 
 
Paper 2:  When Self-interest and Self-identification Conflict 
 
Self-interest is a concept germane to many theories in economics, political science, and 
psychology.  Although somewhat obscured by different terminology, such as vested interest or 
personal relevance, the function of self-interest as a motivating force for individuals is prominent in 
some of the most widely discussed and contested social science theories of this generation.  While 
many of these theories (e.g. dual process theories of attitude formation) assume self-interest as a 
prime motivator of individual thought and behavior, other theories (e.g. symbolic politics) challenge 
that notion directly.  Furthermore, empirical evidence can be readily cited to support both positions. 
Even the most cursory review of the literature surrounding self-interest will reveal an 
important puzzle.  A cumulative body of empirical evidence in social psychology research supports 
the notion of self-interest as an important and relatively consistent force in the formation, structure, 
and expression of attitudes.  However, a more disjointed body of empirical evidence in the political 
science literature finds self-interest to be an inconsistent and relatively weak predictor of political and 
policy attitudes and behavior.   Identifying a cohesive approach to studying the operation of self-
interest in the political context will have implications for several important political processes such as 
the representation of interests, the translation of public opinion into public policy, and political 
participation.    
In this paper, I argue that the self-interest puzzle exists because political scientists have done 
a poor job of incorporating the psychology of self-interest into their theories while social psychologists 
have failed to incorporate the complexities of social contexts, like politics, into their theories.  My goal 
in this project is to overcome the theoretical and methodological differences between the two 
disciplines in order to uncover an integrated understanding of self-interest.  To do this, I develop the 
Integrated Model of Self-Interest, which provides a theoretical framework for understanding the 
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conditional effects of self-interest within the dynamic political context.  My general expectation is that 
the realities of the political context condition the effects of self-interest seen in the psychological 
literature.  As a result, direct effects of self-interest are rare in politics, but important indirect effects 
should be realized at the individual and aggregate levels. 
I begin with a discussion of the arguments and theories surrounding self-interest in both 
political science and social psychology.  I then present the Integrated Model of Self-Interest and use 
the theory to generate hypotheses about the role of self-interest in policy attitudes and behavior.  I 
present data from two survey-based experiments to evaluate the hypotheses.  The results provide 
evidence that self-interest moderates the effects of partisanship and that it has additional influence 
beyond political attitudes including attitude strength and behavioral intentions.          
The Role of Self-Interest in Politics  
Political Preferences.  Early theories of public opinion emphasized the role of self-interest 
as a major determinant of individual preferences.  Campbell et al. (1960) articulate a notion of public 
policy preferences as mere expressions of primitive self-interest (Campbell et al 1960).  Popkin et al. 
(1976) assert that the influence of economic conditions on electoral outcomes results from individuals 
basing their electoral decisions upon the tangible economic situations they face in their daily lives.  
The self-interested motivations of these pocketbook voters served as a central theme in the work on 
the political economy of individuals for several years.  
 Kinder and Kiewiet conducted the first critical investigation of the pocketbook voter 
assumption (1981).  In doing so, they defined the sociotropic voter as an individual influenced most of 
all by the nation’s economic condition and not the condition of their own pocketbook (Kinder and 
Kiewiet 1981).  They argued that individuals develop rough evaluations of the nation’s economic 
condition and place credit or blame on the incumbent government accordingly.  Furthermore, they 
showed that sociotropic perceptions are not simply expressions of ideological or partisan loyalties.  
They and others showed that sociotropic perceptions are more predictive of vote choice than 
pocketbook considerations (Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kinder 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988).      
 Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) expressed an agnostic belief about the motivation driving 
sociotropic effects.  They were clear that sociotropic politics did not necessarily imply a politics of 
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altruism.  Sociotropic politics, they believed, could very well be a politics of indirect self-interest, but 
they were unable to adequately test for this possibility.  Several scholars have since taken up this 
issue and the evidence that has accumulated suggests that sociotropic politics are not indirect 
expressions of self-interest.  Evaluations of group fairness, social value commitments, and beliefs in 
economic individualism seem to moderate the role of self-interest and bolster the effect of sociotropic 
perceptions (Mutz and Mondak 1997; Funk 2000; Funk and Garcia-Monet 1997; Feldman 1982).     
At about the same time that the sociotropic politics literature began questioning the role of 
self-interest, work by Sears and his colleagues explored the relative contribution of self-interested 
motivations compared to symbolic beliefs about race1, political parties, and ideology in predicting 
policy preferences and political behaviors (Kinder and Sears 1981; Lau et al. 1978; Sears et al. 
1980).  Their studies found little or no effect of self-interest on policy preferences across a number of 
domains.  Even when self-interest effects were present, their explanatory power compared to 
symbolic beliefs was quite small.  A recent replication and update of the original work confirms the 
dominant role of symbolic beliefs (Lau 2007). 
 Overall then, the bulk of the evidence from the sociotropic perceptions and symbolic beliefs 
literatures reduces self-interest to a negligible determinant of policy preferences.  However, several 
studies do find a role for self-interest when examining preferences for policies that offer clear benefits 
or costs (Sears and Citrin 1985; Dixon et al. 1991; Wolpert and Gimpel 1998).  Furthermore, survey 
and laboratory based experiments demonstrate that priming self-interest can induce significant self-
interest effects in policy preferences (Sears and Lau 1983; Chong et al. 2001).  Taken together, these 
results suggest that theories of political attitude determinants should not be so quick to dismiss the 
role of self-interest.  The empirical data imply that the role of self-interest is conditional and the 
evidence to date implies that self-interest is most likely to have an impact on attitudes when an 
individual is aware of his or her self-interest and when the implications of the policy options for the 
individual are clear.  The Integrated Model of Self-Interest that I develop provides a theoretical 
framework for understanding these mixed findings. 
                                                 
1 Early work by Sears and colleagues on symbolic racism has been criticized for methodological 
problems such as construct validity and confounding the independent and dependent variables (see 
Sniderman and Tetlock 1986).  Work focusing on the symbolic politics of ideology and partisanship 
(Sears and Lau 1983; Lau 2007) improves upon these methodological problems. 
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 Political Behavior.  Although the evidence for a connection between self-interest and 
political preferences is, at best, irregular, more consistency can be found in the connection between 
self-interest and political behavior.  Several studies utilizing local political events at the level of the 
university (Regan and Fazio 1977), the metropolitan area (Green and Cowden 1992), the state 
(Sivacek and Crano 1982), or national policy (Ratner and Miller 2001) confirm a weak or non-existent 
connection between self-interest and attitudes, but a strong connection between self-interest and 
political behaviors such as petition signing, contacting representatives, and participation in relevant 
interest organizations.   For example, Green and Cowden (1992) look for the effect of self-interest in a 
policy area where the effects of symbolic politics are often cited as more powerful than self-interest.  
They examine busing proposals to integrate schools and find that attitudes in opposition to the policy 
were equal among affected and unaffected whites.  However, affected whites were significantly more 
likely to participate in anti-busing organizations than unaffected whites.  The researchers of the 
aforementioned studies differ in their specific explanations of the causal mechanisms driving the self-
interest and behavior connection, a point I elaborate upon more fully in a later section.  The basic 
sentiment in this body of research is that self-interest may not have any influence on the low-cost act 
of expressing an attitude, but it can influence the decision to engage in more costly behaviors.  
 Beyond the explicit investigation of self-interest’s influence on political behaviors, a role for 
self-interest is apparent in other models of behavior.  For example, rational choice models applied to 
voting, for example, attempt to explain how individuals act given their preferences (Downs 1957; 
Aldrich 1993).  Self-interest, in addition to other values (Mansbridge 1995), is often the assumed 
antecedent to the exogenously fixed preferences of individuals in these models.    While rational 
choice models take preferences and their antecedents as givens, the Integrated Model of Self-
Interest explains the mechanisms and consequences of how these preferences are formed.   
The Role of Self-Interest in Social Psychology   
 Attitude Formation.  Dual process theories of attitude formation provide an account of how 
attitudes can form under two different processes, one requiring more cognitive effort than the other.   
Two of these models in the persuasion literature are the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) and the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Eagly and Chaiken 1993 and Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  Of the 
27 
 
two models, which offer distinct but related accounts of attitude formation, the ELM provides the 
clearest way to think about self-interest in regard to attitude formation.   
The ELM puts forth two routes that individuals might take when forming an attitude (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1981).  Individuals who are both motivated and able to cognitively process information 
relevant to the attitude are likely to take the central route to forming attitudes, which involves more 
cognitive processing and leads to relatively strong attitudes (Petty et al. 1995).  These individuals are 
said to have high elaboration likelihood.   High elaboration indicates a process in which individuals 
carefully attend to issue messages, access relevant information from memory, elaborate upon the 
message using the information from memory, and form an attitude based on this analysis (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986).  Research on the ELM finds that personal relevance (i.e. self-interest), which occurs 
when an issue has significant consequences for the individual, motivates individuals to engage in 
central route processing (Petty and Cacioppo 1979) 2.  Individuals lacking the motivation or ability to 
process information are likely to take the peripheral route to forming an attitude, such that they rely on 
simple cues and heuristics rather than cognitive processing.  These individuals are said to have low 
elaboration likelihood as they do not attend carefully to the message or undergo a process of 
accessing relevant information from memory3. 
 Attitude Strength.  As implied by the dual process models, not all attitudes are equal.  Some 
attitudes are considered stronger than others according to the degree to which an attitude is 
persistent, resistant to change, affects information processes, and is predictive of behavior (Krosnick 
and Petty 1995).  The empirical evidence is accumulating in favor of the view that attitude strength is 
not a single construct, but rather several theoretically and methodologically distinct concepts including 
                                                 
2 Individuals can be motivated to use central route processing for several reasons.  In addition to the 
motivation of self-interest (i.e. personal relevance) discussed in this project, another well researched 
motivation is an individual’s need for cognition.  Individuals high in need for cognition (NFC) enjoy 
engaging in effortful and analytic thinking (Cacioppo and Petty 1982).   
 
3 It should be noted that individuals who rely exclusively on cues or who engage fully in cognitive 
processing occupy the endpoints of the elaboration likelihood continuum.  Most individuals fall 
somewhere along the continuum such that they utilize both arguments and cues to form their 
opinions.  However, it is possible to discriminate between attitude formation that results primarily from 
the peripheral route and attitudes formed using the central route.  Although important to understand 
the underlying continuum, most research considers the processes operating at the endpoints (Petty 
and Cacioppo 1986). 
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attitude importance, accessibility, certainty, ambivalence, and extremity (Miller and Peterson 2004; 
Boninger et al. 1995; Visser et al. 2003).       
 Attitude importance is frequently linked to self-interest in the literature.  Attitude importance is 
defined as an “individual’s subjective sense of the concern, caring, and significance he or she 
attaches to an attitude” (Boninger et al. 1995, p.62).  Attitude importance is a subjective judgment an 
individual makes about his or her own attitude.  Because individuals are generally aware of what 
issues they feel passionately about, the concept of attitude importance is commonly operationalized 
using a straightforward question(s) about the degree to which the respondent is concerned and cares 
about the issue.   Important attitudes have several consequences relevant to understanding political 
public opinion.  For example, important attitudes are associated with information storage and retrieval 
processes that improve levels of knowledge accumulation and accurate recall (Krosnick 1990, 
Holbrook et al. 2005).        
The research to date identifies three significant causes of attitude importance: material self-
interest, personal values, and social identifications.  Both survey and experimental data suggest that 
each antecedent has an independent and significant effect on attitude importance (Boninger et al. 
1995).  First, when a person’s attitude becomes instrumental to personal outcomes, like tangible 
rights, privileges, or lifestyle, material self-interest can lead to attitude importance (Johnson and Eagly 
1989, Boninger et al. 1995).  In the political realm, policies for which people perceive a direct stake in 
their outcome are likely to activate self-interest (Pompkin et al. 1976).  Second, when an individual 
relates the attitude object to his or her personal values, the attitude is likely to be personally important 
(Boninger et al. 1995).  Values guide individuals to determine what attitudes and beliefs are worth 
caring about (Rokeach 1968).  To the extent that an issue and a value are linked, an individual will 
consider the attitude to be important (Boninger et al. 1995).  Third, when a social group that a person 
identifies with becomes linked to an attitude, the individual may consider the attitude to be personally 
important.  There are two possible mechanisms for this link.  First, an attitude may become important 
if the rights of an individual’s group are challenged, even if the individual is not personally affected 
(Modigliani and Gamson 1979).  For example, a retired woman may consider her attitudes on an 
equal pay policy important because she identifies with women even though she would no longer be 
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materially impacted by the policy.  Second, an attitude may become important for an individual 
because the group considers the issue important (Sherif and Hovland 1961).   Per the previous 
example, if the National Organization for Woman declares the equal pay policy a top priority, the 
retired woman who identifies with the group may reflect that priority in her personal attitudes.  
The implication of this research for politics is that individuals with a self-interest in an issue 
are likely to form strong attitudes about the issue, and in particular, consider those attitudes to be 
personally important.  But, this implication fails to consider the complexities of the political context.  If 
self-interest, social identifications, and values all have independent effects on attitude importance, we 
need to consider the common political situation in which an individual’s self-interest does not comport 
with his or her social identifications or values on a particular issue.  This complexity is exactly what 
the Integrated Model of Self-Interest is able to address.   
 The Attitude-Behavior Connection.  The initial explosion of social psychological research 
related to attitudes was based, in large part, on the assumption that attitudes guide behavior.  This 
assumption was challenged directly in the late sixties when evidence against attitude-behavior 
consistency was produced in study after study (Wicker 1969, Abelson 1972, Rokeach 1968).   The 
field then shifted direction and began a line of research on the moderators of the attitude-behavior 
connection (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977, Fazio and Zanna 1981).   Moderators of the attitude-behavior 
connection range from methodological issues such as ensuring comparable specificity of attitude and 
behavior measurement (Ajzen and Fazio 1977), qualities of individuals such as self-monitoring 
(Snyder 1987), qualities of the context such as social norms (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980), and qualities 
of attitude strength such as importance or accessibility (Krosnick and Petty 1995, Fazio 2000). 
 There are three moderators of the attitude-behavior connection that explicitly or implicitly 
involve self-interest.   The first moderator is direct behavioral experience.  In one study involving an 
undergraduate housing shortage, researchers found higher levels of attitude-behavior consistency 
among students with direct, personal experience with the shortage than students with only second 
hand knowledge of the shortage (Regan and Fazio 1977).  Additional laboratory experiments find 
support for the idea that individuals who form their attitudes based on personal involvement with the 
attitude object tend to display greater levels of attitude-behavior consistency (Fazio and Zanna 1978).              
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A second moderator of the attitude-behavior connection is self-interest.  In this theory, put 
forth by Sivacek and Crano (1982), an individual need not have direct experience with the attitude 
object but only perceive that the attitude object has tangible consequences for his or her life.  In two 
studies, one involving a change in the drinking age and one involving the institution of comprehensive 
undergraduate exams, where undergraduates were differentially affected by the policy depending on 
age or year of study, the researchers found significantly greater levels of attitude-behavior 
consistency among the students with a self-interested stake in the outcome (Sivacek and Crano 
1982).  In their study of busing attitudes, Green and Cowden (1992) suggest that the moderating 
effect of self-interest occurs because self-interest in the outcome justifies the cost of acting on 
attitudes.  
The third moderator of the attitude-behavior connection relating to self-interest is the social 
norm of self-interest (Ratner and Miller 2001).  This theory suggests that although some individuals 
will hold a positive attitude toward an object, they will only act on that attitude if they have a self-
interested stake in the outcome because of a social norm in the U.S. that people should act when 
their interests are at stake.  Miller and Ratner (1998) find evidence of the norm of self-interest such as 
individuals overestimating the power of self-interest on other individuals’ attitudes and actions.  
Furthermore, individuals in these studies demonstrate surprise when others acted on issues for which 
they had no personal stake, which suggests that acting on attitudes not grounded in self-interest is 
against the norm.  By manipulating the names of activist organizations in several studies, the 
researchers conclude that providing standing to non-interested individuals overcomes the norm of 
self-interest and allows them to act on their attitudes.   Grounded in this research, but with a fuller 
understanding of the political context, the Integrated Model of Self-Interest allows me to make 
predictions about the connection between self-interest and political behavior.  
An Integrated Model of Self-Interest 
The literature review points to the central question guiding this research.  If self-interest really 
has the significant effect on attitudes and behaviors that the social psychologists find, why do political 
scientists have such a difficult time consistently locating that effect in the political context?   My goal 
in this project is to overcome the theoretical and methodological differences between the two 
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disciplines in order to uncover an integrated understanding of self-interest.  My general expectation is 
that the realities of the political context condition the effects of self-interest seen in the psychological 
literature.  As a result, direct effects of self-interest are rare in politics, but important indirect effects 
should be realized at the individual and aggregate levels.  
 This study focuses on one reality of the political context responsible for conditioning the 
effects of self-interest found in the psychological literature. Individuals are likely to face conflicting 
messages in the political environment.  We know from the psychological literature that important 
attitudes, those attitudes expected to guide behavioral choices, are more likely when the attitude 
involves self-interest and/or social identifications and values.  The political context is likely to confront 
individuals with situations where their self-interest conflicts with their social identifications or values 
and leads to different attitudes.  Therefore, the central questions guiding this study are: 1. Does self-
interest affect an individual’s reliance on peripheral cues and other information processing techniques 
in the political environment?  2.  What are the downstream effects of the conflict between self-interest, 
social identifications, and values for attitude strength and behavior? 
The Integrated Model of Self-Interest provides an explanation for the role of self-interest in a 
context where self-interest and social identifications or values do not always align.  However, before 
delving into the theory, it is important to define the central concepts.  Self-interest is defined as an 
individual’s material interests.  These material interests are not limited to monetary resources like tax 
refunds, but can also include resources like health insurance or local infrastructure improvements.  
Social identifications are defined as groups to which individuals consider themselves members or 
affiliates.  These identifications include objective memberships like race and gender, as well as 
subjective memberships like political parties.  Finally, values are defined as abstract beliefs about 
how a person should behave and the ideal outcomes he or she should achieve.  Some examples of 
values in the political realm include ideology and equality. 
The Integrated Model of Self-Interest begins with the premise that the political environment 
provides individuals with a large amount of information they can use to form policy preferences.  
Individuals can use each piece of information as either an informational argument or a peripheral cue 
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(i.e. heuristic) depending on the degree to which an individual is relying on cognitive processing to 
form their preferences. Included among the different types of information available are: 
 Arguments about the merits and consequences of policy options for different types of 
individuals.  These arguments connect policies with individual self-interest. 
 Arguments about the merits and consequences of policy options for different groups.  These 
arguments connect policies with groups to which an individual might belong.   
 Endorsements of policy options by politicians and political parties.  These endorsements 
serve to connect the policy options to political groups that an individual might identify with.    
 Policy frames that connect the policy to broader ideological values, such as conservatism or 
equality. 
Recall from the discussion of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) that individuals are 
likely to engage in cognitively oriented information processing, called central route processing, when 
they are able and motivated to think about the issue (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  In the realm of 
political decision-making, I propose that self-interest serves as a source of motivation that has 
consequences for information processing, attitudes, and behavior that are distinct from social 
identifications like party affiliation or values like ideology.  Self-interest suggests that the policy issue 
carries significant consequences for the individual.  As self-interest increases, people will become 
more motivated to cognitively process the issue information available in the political environment.  
The intrinsic consequences of the issue motivate self-interested individuals to form and hold a correct 
attitude because the costs of holding an incorrect attitude are large.  Within the political context, 
individuals without a self-interested stake in a policy outcome may not face the same consequences 
of holding an incorrect attitude even in cases where individuals hold strong social identifications or 
values relevant to the policy.   
These features of the Integrated Model of Self-Interest point toward an important effect of the 
political context on self-interest. What happens when an individual’s self-interest and social 
identifications or values conflict and point toward different attitudes?  According to the Integrated 
Model of Self-Interest, once they are cognitively engaged, individuals with a self-interested stake in 
the policy outcome will be more likely to consider messages about their social identifications and 
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values available in the political environment as informational arguments.  Compare this to individuals 
lacking a self-interested motive in the policy outcome who are likely to rely on the social identification 
and value messages as simple cues to form their preferences.  Self-interested individuals have a 
tangible stake in the outcome of a policy and will elaborate upon the information provided by social 
identifications and values more than individuals without a self-interest.  As a result, individuals with a 
self-interest are likely to hold stronger attitudes than individuals without a self-interest.              
 Two survey-based experiments provide the data used to test these expectations through a 
series of specific hypotheses.  Both experiments were included in the 2009 Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study (CCES) fielded in the fall of 2009.  Survey respondents were first 
randomized to receive one of the two experiments, and then randomized into the different conditions 
within each experiment.  Each experiment and the hypotheses are described in additional detail 
below.  Appendix 2.A includes the full text of the experimental conditions, relevant questionnaire 
items, and respondent demographics.   
 
Experiment A: Elaborating on ELM with Partisan Cues 
 Experimental Design. 
Experiment A is based on a typical ELM design in which participants receive information 
about a particular issue.  This information is manipulated to affect the individual directly (self-interest 
condition) or not (no self-interest condition).  In a second manipulation, the information is presented 
through high quality arguments (strong argument condition) or low quality arguments (weak argument 
condition).  After reading the information, participants are asked for their opinion on the issue.  The 
expected outcome is that individuals made to believe the issue is relevant for them personally will be 
motivated to carefully consider the information presented.  As such, their support for the issue will 
depend on the quality of the arguments presented.  Individuals for whom the information is not 
relevant will not elaborate on the information presented and their support will not vary according to 
the quality of the arguments presented.   
 Experiment A followed this format.  Each survey respondent was randomized to receive 
information about a tax stimulus occurring in his or her state (self-interest condition) or in “a 
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Midwestern state” (no self-interest condition).  Respondents received either three strong arguments in 
support of the issue or three weak arguments in support of the issue.  Furthermore, Experiment A 
included a third manipulation in which the source of the information was credited to either Democrats 
or Republicans.  Using responses to the survey’s party identification question, respondents were then 
coded as receiving the arguments from their party (own party condition) or the opposing party (other 
party condition).     
 Outcome Measures. 
The first outcome measure asks respondents to report their level of support, on a 5 point 
scale, for the tax stimulus policy (policy support).  Respondents indicating that they strongly support 
or somewhat support the policy are coded as in support, while those who indicate being neutral, 
somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed are coded as opposed to the policy4.  Respondents were 
also asked to report how important the issue was to them personally (attitude importance), how sure 
they were of their attitude (attitude certainty), and how much conflict they felt about the issue (attitude 
ambivalence).  Finally, respondents were asked if they would be willing to be contacted by an 
organization that shares their view on the issue (behavior contact), their intention to donate money to 
an organization working on the issue (behavior money), and to write a letter to a public official about 
the issue (behavior letter).   
Hypotheses. 
According to the Integrated Model of Self-Interest, I expect self-interested individuals to use 
all information available to them as arguments, which they elaborate upon to form an attitude about 
the policy.  Individuals without a self-interest in the policy will use the information as cues to form an 
attitude.   As such, I derive the following hypotheses. 
1a.  Self-interested individuals will be motivated to carefully consider the arguments and use 
both the quality and the partisan source as information.   As displayed in Panel A of Figure 2.1 below, 
they should show equal levels of support for the policy when it is delivered by their party under both 
                                                 
4 The results for policy support are presented in two categories (support or not) for simplicity, 
however, findings remain the same if support is analyzed as a three category variable (support, 
neutral, oppose).   
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the weak and strong argument conditions.  When the information is delivered by the opposing party, 
self-interested individuals’ support will vary according to the quality of the argument.   
1b.  Individuals without a self-interest in the policy will rely on partisan cues as a peripheral 
cue.  They will therefore show greater levels of support when the information is attributed to their 
party.  Their support will not vary by the quality of the argument.  This relationship is displayed in 
Panel B of Figure 2.1.   
Figure 2.1: Hypothesized Effect of Self-Interest on Attitude by Party Endorsement and 
Argument Strength 
 
Panel A: Self-Interest 
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Panel B:  No Self-Interest 
 
 
2a.  By motivating individuals to elaborate upon the information in the political environment, 
the attitudes of self-interested individuals will be stronger and self-interested individuals will be more 
likely to engage in behaviors consistent with their attitudes even when the opposing party is 
endorsing the policy.  This relationship is displayed in Panel A of Figure 2.2.   
 2b.  Having relied on partisan cues to inform their arguments, the attitude strength and 
behavioral intensions of individuals without a self-interest will depend upon the partisan endorsement 
of the policy, as shown in Panel B of Figure 2.2.     
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Figure 2.2: Hypothesized Effect of Self-Interest on Attitude Strength and Behavior by Party 
Endorsement 
Panel A:  Self-Interest 
 
Panel B:  No Self-Interest 
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 Results.  
A total of 685 respondents were randomly assigned to Experiment A.  To evaluate the 
manipulations, I provide the average level of support for the tax stimulus issue by condition in Table 
2.1.  As expected under ELM, the support of respondents in the no self-interest condition does not 
vary according to the quality of the information presented.  Respondents in the self-interest condition, 
however, were significantly more likely to support the issue when they received strong compared to 
weak arguments.     
Table 2.1:  Percent in Favor of Tax Stimulus by ELM Condition  
 Strong Argument Weak Argument 
Self-Interest 
Condition 
47%* 
(3.7) 
38% 
(3.6) 
No Self-Interest 
Condition 
42% 
(4.0) 
37% 
(3.8) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.   
(*) indicates a significant difference from the weak argument condition at p<.05, one-tailed test.   
 
Results for self-interested individuals are in the direction expected under hypothesis 1a, 
however, the differences are not significant.  When individuals in the self-interest condition received 
information on the policy from their own party, the mean level of support was equal for the weak 
argument condition (40%) and the strong argument condition (40%).  When the other party delivered 
the information, 48% of respondents were supportive under the strong argument condition, compared 
to 41% under the weak argument condition (t=0.76, d.f.=107).   This relationship is shown in the top 
panel of Figure 2.3.   
 Individuals in the no self-interest condition signal the interaction predicted in hypothesis 1b.  
Support for the policy was significantly higher when the arguments were presented by the 
respondent’s own party (46%), compared to the opposing party (36%) (t=1.3, d.f.=208).  Also, as 
expected, respondents in the no self-interest condition did not show any differences in their support 
for the tax policy depending on the quality of the argument when it was presented by the opposing 
party.  Although not anticipated, when receiving the information from their own party, individuals in the 
no self-interest condition showed higher support under the strong argument condition (51%) than the 
weak argument condition (41%) (t=1.04, d.f.=111).   This result suggests that in the absence of self-
interest, an individual who receives information from their own party may be motivated to elaborate.  
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This finding seems to fit in among theories like motivated reasoning, in which individuals tend to seek 
out and pay attention to information that they believe will confirm existing beliefs (Kunda 1990).  
These relationships can be seen in the bottom panel of Figure 2.3.   
Figure 2.3: The Effect of Self-Interest, Partisan Cues, and Argument Quality on Attitudes 
 
 
 
 The data presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 evaluate hypotheses 2a and 2b.  Table 2.2 shows 
the differences between the proportions of individuals indicating a positive response on the 
indicators of attitude strength and behavior indicators by self-interest condition.  As expected, more 
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individuals in the self-interest condition demonstrate greater levels of attitude strength and 
intentions to engage in behaviors consistent with their attitudes.  These differences are significant 
for attitude importance and certainty only.  The only case where the results are not in the expected 
direction is for attitude ambivilance, where slightly more individuals in the self-interest condition 
indicated feeling at least a little conflict about their attitude (53% compared to 51%).  
Table 2.2: Effect of Self-Interest on Attitude Strength and Behavior Intentions 
 Importance Certainty Ambivalence Intend 
Write Letter 
Intend Give 
Money 
Willing 
Receive 
Contact 
(% Self-
Interest) – 
(% No Self-
Interest) 
4.2^ 
(3.1) 
3.1* 
(1.8) 
1.7 
(3.2) 
2.8 
(3.0) 
1.4 
(2.1) 
1.3 
(3.2) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  (*) indicates p<.05, one-tailed test.  (^) indicates p<.10, one-
tailed test.   
 
Table 2.3 adds in the interaction of self-interest with the partisan source of the tax stimulus 
policy information.  The cell values in Table 2.3 represent the difference between respondents who 
received arguments endorsed by their own party and those who received arguments endorsed by 
the other party.  For example, in the self-interest condition, the percentage of respondents who 
reported an intention to give money when their own party endorsed the arguments was less than 
when the other party endorsed the arguments, a difference of 16.1%.  Again, the pattern of results 
for attitude importance and certainty are consistent with expectations.  Party endorsements had a 
larger effect on these outcomes for individuals in the no self-interest condition compared to 
individuals in the self-interest condition.  Again the attitude ambivalence measure produces 
unexpected results for the self-interest condition.  The expectation was no difference by party 
source for self-interested individuals.  However, significantly more individuals in the self-interest 
condition (59%) reported at least a little conflict about their attitude when the source of the 
information came from their own party. 
 The behavioral intention measures show the expected pattern for individuals in the no self-
interest condition.  More of these individuals report an intent to write a letter, contribute money, or 
be contacted by an organization when the policy information is presented by their own party.  
However, these differences are not statistically significant, so there is not enough evidence to make 
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a positive claim about the relationship.  There is a significant, though unexpected finding on the 
behavioral intention indicators for individuals in the self-interest condition.  The expectation was that 
the individuals in the self-interest condition would not vary by party.  However, as shown in Table 3, 
these individuals were more likely to report an intention to act on their attitudes when they received 
the message from the other party.  This is especially true for the higher cost activities of writing a 
letter or contributing money.  It is also true for those individuals who support the policy and those 
who do not.  In other words, self-interested individuals are more likely to donate money to an 
organization that shares their view on the issue when the issue is endorsed by the opposing party – 
whether they support or oppose the policy.   
Table 2.3: Effect of the Self-Interest – Party Interaction on Attitude Strength and Behavior 
Intentions 
(% Own 
Party) – 
(% Other 
Party) Importance Certainty Ambivalence 
Intend 
Write 
Letter 
Intend 
Give 
Money 
Willing 
Receive 
Contact 
Self-
Interest 
Condition 
2.6 
(5.6) 
0.1 
(3.4) 
8.1^ 
(5.6) 
-16.1* 
(5.3) 
-12.5* 
(1.8) 
-0.3 
(5.6) 
No Self-
Interest 
Condition 
4.7 
(5.8) 
3.3 
(3.9) 
2.7 
(5.9) 
3.0 
(5.3) 
4.5 
(4.2) 
1.5 
(5.8) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  (*) indicates p<.05, one-tailed test.  (^) indicates p<.10, one-
tailed test.   
 
Experiment B: Attitude Updating When Self-Interest and Party Identification Conflict 
 Experimental Design. 
Respondents assigned to Experiment B were first presented with a basic question asking 
about their level of support for the same tax stimulus policy in their state (self-interest condition) or in 
a Midwestern state (no self-interest condition).  After answering the question, respondents were then 
presented with the same strong arguments in support of the policy used in Experiment A.  The source 
of the arguments was attributed to either the Democrats or Republicans.  Respondents were then 
given an opportunity to change their support for the policy given the new information.  Using the 
survey question on party identification, respondents were coded as having received the follow-up 
information from members of their own party or the opposing party.   
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Outcome Measures. 
  The central outcome measure is the proportion of respondents in each condition who change 
their attitude in a positive direction after hearing the high quality arguments.  Across conditions, 18% 
of respondents changed their attitude from opposing to supporting the policy, 80% didn’t change their 
attitude, and only 2% changed from supporting to opposing the policy after hearing the supportive 
arguments.  Also, as in Experiment A, respondents were asked the same set of questions to measure 
dimensions of attitude strength including personal importance, certainty, and ambivalence, as well as 
behavioral intentions.  
Hypotheses.   
This experiment examines how individuals will use new information about the tax policy issue 
to update their attitudes.  The manipulation requires that individuals form an attitude based on very 
little information about the policy and allows me to examine the effects of both self-interest and 
partisanship on the individual’s likelihood to update their opinion after receiving high quality 
arguments in support of the policy from one of the two parties.   
3a.  The Integrated Model of Self-Interest predicts that individuals with a self-interest in a 
policy will elaborate on all types of information available in the political environment.  As such, I 
expect that individuals in the self-interest condition will increase their support for the tax stimulus 
policy after hearing the high quality arguments in favor of the policy.  This increase in support should 
occur regardless of the partisan endorsement of the information, as shown in Panel A of Figure 2.4.    
3b.  Individuals without a self-interest in the policy will, according to the theory, use the 
information in the environment as peripheral cues to form their attitudes.  Therefore, I expect that 
individuals in the no self-interest condition will increase their support for the tax stimulus policy after 
hearing high quality arguments in favor of the policy more often when their own party endorses the 
policy, as shown in Panel B of Figure 2.4.    
Furthermore, Experiment B provides another opportunity to test the hypotheses about self-
interest’s effect on attitude strength and behavior.   
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Figure 2.4:  Hypothesized Effect of Self-Interest and Partisan Identification on Attitude Change 
by Party Endorsement 
 
Panel A: Self-Interest 
 
Panel B: No Self-Interest 
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Results. 
Three hundred and fourteen respondents were randomized into Experiment B.  Forty-three 
percent of respondents in the self-interest condition supported the policy compared to 27% in the no 
self-interest condition (t=2.99, d.f.=312).   
The results indicate support for both hypotheses 3a and 3b.  As shown in Figure 2.5, 
individuals in the self-interest condition used the information presented in support of the tax stimulus 
policy to update their opinion in favor of the policy.  This occurred for 16% of the respondents whose 
information was endorsed by the opposing party, and for 23% of the respondents whose information 
was endorsed by their own party (t=1.63, d.f.= 87).  Individuals in the no self-interest condition show 
evidence of a reliance on partisan cues.  Individuals in this condition only changed their attitude in 
support of the issue when the information was presented by their own party (29%, t=2.88, d.f.=64).   
Figure 2.5: Effect of Self-Interest and Partisan Identification on Attitude Change 
 
 The pattern of results for the direct effect of self-interest and the interaction of self-interest 
and partisan endorsements on indicators of attitude strength and behavioral intentions are replicated 
in Experiment B with two exceptions.  In Experiment B, respondents in the no self-interest condition 
were no more likely to feel “at least a little conflict” about their attitude (55%) than respondents in the 
self-interest condition (49%, t=0.90, d.f.=87).  Furthermore, among individuals in the self-interest 
condition, there were no differences in attitude ambivalence by party endorsement (51% other party 
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and 50% own party).  The second deviation from the results in Experiment A occurs for the intention 
to contribute money indicator for individuals in the self-interest condition.  In Experiment A, self-
interested individuals were more likely to report an intention to contribute money when the opposing 
party endorsed the information.  In Experiment B, self-interested individuals were as likely to report an 
intention to contribute money when their own party endorsed the information (10%) compared to the 
opposing party (6%, t=.71, d.f.=86).   
Conclusions 
The Integrated Model of Self-Interest aims to merge the psychology of self-interest with the 
realities of the political context.  This study examined the scenario in which an individual’s self-interest 
in a policy conflicts with his or her party’s support of the policy.  In this scenario, the theory argues 
subtle, but important, effects of self-interest in politics.  First, self-interest should motivate individuals 
to carefully consider the information available in the environment, including party labels, political 
values, and facts.  By modifying an established ELM experimental design to include partisan 
endorsements of a policy, I was able to show that self-interested individuals were motivated to 
consider policy information and able to recognize the difference between strong and weak arguments 
for the policy.  Self-interested individuals used the partisan information as an argument to form their 
attitudes. For example, self-interested individuals used their party’s endorsement of an issue to 
bolster the effect of low quality arguments.   
Second, the results indicated that self-interested individuals who have formed a preliminary 
attitude will engage with additional information rather than rely on party cues alone to update their 
attitudes.  In this study, self-interested individuals who formed negative attitudes toward a vague 
policy were willing to change those attitudes after encountering strong arguments in favor of the 
policy even when those arguments were attributed to the opposing party.  On the other hand, 
individuals without a self-interest showed evidence of a reliance on party cues and only updated their 
attitudes when their party endorsed the information.   
The final, subtle effect of self-interest examined in this study looked beyond the basic 
expression of an attitude to the attitude’s strength and correspondence with behaviors.  The pattern of 
results showed that individuals in the self-interest conditions were more likely to consider their 
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attitudes personally important and to feel certain of their attitudes.  Although never statistically 
significant, self-interested individuals were consistently more likely to report the intention to engage in 
behaviors consistent with their attitudes.  Furthermore, partisan endorsements had little effect on 
attitude importance and certainty for self-interested individuals.  Individuals without a self-interest in 
the policy who received information from their own party were consistently more likely to indicate 
strong attitudes and behavioral intentions than those receiving information from the opposing party.   
This study is only a first step in both evaluating and refining the Integrated Model of Self-
Interest.  While the results demonstrate consistent patterns, the magnitudes of differences were 
relatively small.  The self-interest manipulation was designed to be realistic and applicable to a broad 
population.  However, a small tax rebate may not have created a strong sense of self-interest.  This 
study also yielded some unexpected results that the Integrated Model of Self-Interest does not 
currently explain.  The first of these findings (that individuals without a self-interest in a policy are 
motivated to elaborate on information when it is presented by their own party) seems to fit in well with 
existing cognitive theories and theories at the intersection of affect and cognition.  The second of 
these findings (that self-interested individuals are more likely to engage in behaviors consistent with 
their attitudes when they receive information from the other party) will require additional investigation.  
For sure, both findings present an opportunity for further specification of the theory.   
The Integrated Model of Self-Interest provides a new way of conceiving the role of self-
interest in politics.  Its primary purpose is to move away from debates about the simple relationships 
between self-interest, social identifications, or values and attitudes.  Rather, the objective is to 
understand how these factors relate in a dynamic context like politics and what their downstream 
effects are for attitudes and behaviors.  
 
 
  
 
 
Paper 3:  Sending Signals: How Self-interested Individuals Help Policymakers 
 
Although the public face of politics frequently manifests itself in short sound bites and a 
mantra that simple messages are persuasive messages, behind the scenes, modern government is 
comprised of the complex political and policy decisions that form specific rules, regulations, and laws. 
We know that aggregate public opinion is one of many inputs into this complex policymaking process 
in the United States.  A considerable body of evidence finds that the public’s preferences have 
important effects on electoral and public policy outcomes (Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson 1999; Kelly 2005; Wlezien 1995).  Furthermore, public policy 
scholars and practitioners observe in real time the determinants of public opinion and their 
consequences on important public policy issues (Hutchings 2003; Oberlander 2003). However, the 
public sends simple signals while policymakers operate among complexities.  This means that 
policymakers need to read and anticipate a simple signal, basically that the public wants government 
to do more or less, and translate that signal into the specific rules, regulations, and laws that support 
complex U.S. policies. This process of representation could be improved if there was a clear signal to 
which policymakers could locate and utilize.   
 The question is therefore: Where can policymakers look to find a clear signal about 
individuals’ policy-specific preferences among the general signal from aggregate public opinion?  In 
this study, I argue that the segment of the public that has a strong self-interest in a policy is capable 
of providing policymakers with policy-specific preferences.  I build on existing evidence about the role 
of self-interest in the political science, psychology, and communications literatures to provide 
evidence that individuals with a material interest in a policy domain demonstrate attitude constraint 
across issue specific policies and report behaviors that are likely to provide information on policy-
specific preferences to policymakers. My expectations about the ability of self-interested individuals to 
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help policymakers infer specific policy preferences from the aggregate public opinion signal stem from 
ongoing work to develop the Integrated Model of Self-Interest.  This model provides a way to 
reconcile the discrepancy between the observed effects of self-interest in the psychological literature 
and the inability to find an effect of self-interest in the political science literature. If self-interest has the 
individual level effects predicted by the Integrated Model, then self-interested individuals will have 
rational opinions on specific policies that emerge as a clear signal.  Furthermore, self-interested 
individuals will be more likely to engage in behaviors such as interest group participation and other 
forms of activism that also send signals that can help policymakers infer specific policy desires from 
the general signal they receive from the larger public.  
I begin by presenting the different theories and arguments on the role of self-interest in 
politics and the debate about the presence and relevance of issue publics.  I then present the 
Integrated Model of Self-Interest and discuss the expectations of the theory for understanding how 
self-interested individuals provide specific issue information to policymakers.  In the next section, I 
utilize individual level opinion data on health care reform to test aspects of the theory.  I conclude with 
a discussion of the results and their implications for the role of self-interest in politics.   
A Contested Role of Self-Interest in Politics 
Political Preferences.  Early theories of public opinion emphasized the role of self-interest 
as a major determinant of individual preferences.  Campbell et al. (1960) articulate a notion of public 
policy preferences as mere expressions of primitive self-interest (Campbell et al 1960).  Popkin et al. 
(1976) assert that the influence of economic conditions on electoral outcomes results from individuals 
basing their electoral decisions upon the tangible economic situations they face in their daily lives.  
The self-interested motivations of these pocketbook voters served as a central theme in the work on 
the political economy of individuals for several years.  
 Kinder and Kiewiet conducted the first critical investigation of the pocketbook voter 
assumption (1981).  In doing so, they defined the sociotropic voter as an individual influenced most of 
all by the nation’s economic condition and not the condition of their own pocketbook (Kinder and 
Kiewiet 1981).  They argued that individuals develop rough evaluations of the nation’s economic 
condition and place credit or blame on the incumbent government accordingly.  Furthermore, they 
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showed that sociotropic perceptions are not simply expressions of ideological or partisan loyalties.  
They and others showed that sociotropic perceptions are more predictive of vote choice than 
pocketbook considerations (Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kinder 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988).      
 Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) expressed an agnostic belief about the motivation driving 
sociotropic effects.  They were clear that sociotropic politics did not necessarily imply a politics of 
altruism.  Sociotropic politics, they believed, could very well be a politics of indirect self-interest, but 
they were unable to adequately test for this possibility.  Several scholars have since taken up this 
issue and the evidence that has accumulated suggests that sociotropic politics are not indirect 
expressions of self-interest.  Evaluations of group fairness, social value commitments, and beliefs in 
economic individualism seem to moderate the role of self-interest and bolster the effect of sociotropic 
perceptions (Mutz and Mondak 1997; Funk 2000; Funk and Garcia-Monet 1997; Feldman 1982).     
At about the same time that the sociotropic politics literature began questioning the role of 
self-interest, work by Sears and his colleagues explored the relative contribution of self-interested 
motivations compared to symbolic beliefs about race1, political parties, and ideology in predicting 
policy preferences and political behaviors (Kinder and Sears 1981; Lau et al. 1978; Sears et al. 
1980).  Their studies found little or no effect of self-interest on policy preferences across a number of 
domains.  Even when self-interest effects were present, their explanatory power compared to 
symbolic beliefs was quite small.  A recent replication and update of the original work confirms the 
dominant role of symbolic beliefs (Lau 2007). 
 Overall then, the bulk of the evidence from the sociotropic perceptions and symbolic beliefs 
literatures reduces self-interest to a negligible determinant of policy preferences.  However, several 
studies do find a role for self-interest when examining preferences for policies that offer clear benefits 
or costs (Sears and Citrin 1985; Dixon et al. 1991; Wolpert and Gimpel 1998).  Furthermore, survey 
and laboratory based experiments demonstrate that priming self-interest can induce significant self-
interest effects in policy preferences (Sears and Lau 1983; Chong et al. 2001).  Taken together, these 
                                                     
1 Early work by Sears and colleagues on symbolic racism has been criticized for methodological 
problems such as construct validity and confounding the independent and dependent variables (see 
Sniderman and Tetlock 1986).  Work focusing on the symbolic politics of ideology and partisanship 
(Sears and Lau 1983; Lau 2007) improves upon these methodological problems. 
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results suggest that theories of political attitude determinants should not be so quick to dismiss the 
role of self-interest. 
 Political Behavior.  Although the evidence for a connection between self-interest and 
political preferences is, at best, irregular, more consistency can be found in the connection between 
self-interest and political behavior.  Several studies utilizing local political events at the level of the 
university (Regan and Fazio 1977), the metropolitan area (Green and Cowden 1992), the state 
(Sivacek and Crano 1982), or national policy (Ratner and Miller 2001) confirm a weak or non-existent 
connection between self-interest and attitudes, but a stronger connection between self-interest and 
political behaviors such as petition signing, contacting representatives, and participation in relevant 
interest organizations.   For example, Green and Cowden (1992) look for the effect of self-interest in a 
policy area where the effects of symbolic politics are often cited as more powerful than self-interest.  
They examine busing proposals to integrate schools and find that attitudes in opposition to the policy 
were equal among affected and unaffected whites.  However, affected whites were significantly more 
likely to participate in anti-busing organizations than unaffected whites.  Although, the researchers of 
the aforementioned studies differ in their specific explanations of the causal mechanisms driving the 
self-interest and behavior connection, the basic sentiment in this body of research is that self-interest 
may not have any influence on the low-cost act of expressing an attitude, but it will influence the 
decision to engage in more costly behaviors.  The Integrated Model presented in this study provides a 
causal explanation for this influence, as well as the implications for representation and the connection 
between the public and policymakers.     
 Macro Influences.  Collections of individuals that consider certain policies important and that 
attend to information, evaluate candidates, and vote based on those policies constitute issue publics.  
Issue voting, especially voting based on hard issues, represents the Downsian ideal of thoughtful 
decision making by citizens for whom the issue is considered important (Downs 1957; Carmines and 
Stimson 1980).  This literature can be simplified into two hypotheses regarding the origins of issue 
publics.  In the first, education and other indicators of cognitive sophistication determine the likelihood 
that an individual will engage in issue voting (Miller et al. 1976; Almond 1950; Carmines and Stimson 
1980; Price and Zallar 1993).   The implication of this hypothesis is that a subset of the electorate – 
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the educated – will hold important attitudes on many different policies and use those attitudes in their 
voting calculus most of the time.  In the second hypothesis, individuals need not have sophisticated 
cognitive skills in order to hold important policy attitudes and use those attitudes to attend to 
information or for candidate evaluation and voting (Converse 1964; Iyengar 1990; Hutchings 2003).  
Rather, individuals for whom a policy has consequences for their material self-interest, social 
identifications, or personal values are likely to engage in the sophisticated decision calculus leading 
to issue voting (Converse 1964; Krosnick 1990).  The implication of this hypothesis is that most 
individuals will hold important attitudes about just a few policies and use those attitudes in their voting 
calculus.  Using several methods from secondary analysis of NES data to laboratory experiments, 
Krosnick (1990) finds more support for this hypothesis than the education hypothesis. 
Elaboration Likelihood Model of Attitude Formation.  
 The conditional nature of self-interest can potentially be explained using models of attitude 
formation available in the social psychology literature.  The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of 
persuasion is of particular relevance to understanding the roles of self-interest, sociotropic 
perceptions, and symbolic beliefs.  The Elaboration Likelihood Model puts forth two routes that 
individuals might take when forming an attitude (Petty and Cacioppo 1981).  Individuals who are both 
motivated and able to cognitively process information relevant to the attitude are likely to take the 
central route to forming attitudes, which involves more cognitive processing and leads to relatively 
accessible and stable attitudes (Petty et al. 1995).  These individuals are said to have high 
elaboration likelihood.   High elaboration indicates a process in which individuals carefully attend to 
issue messages, access relevant information from memory, elaborate upon the message using the 
information from memory, and form an attitude based on this analysis (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  
Research on the ELM finds that personal relevance, which occurs when an issue has significant 
consequences for the individual, motivates individuals to engage in central route processing (Petty 
and Cacioppo 1979).  Individuals lacking the motivation or ability to process information are likely to 
take the peripheral route to forming an attitude, such that they rely on simple cues and heuristics 
rather than cognitive processing.  These individuals are said to have low elaboration likelihood as 
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they do not attend carefully to the message or undergo a process of accessing relevant information 
from memory2.         
An Integrated Model of Self-Interest 
My objective is to provide a theoretical understanding of the conditional nature of self-interest 
effects in politics. The Integrated Model of Self-Interest begins with the premise that the political 
environment provides individuals with a large amount of information they can use to form policy 
preferences.  Individuals can use each piece of information as either an informational argument or a 
peripheral cue (i.e. heuristic) depending on the degree to which an individual is relying on cognitive 
processing to form their preferences. Included among the different types of information available are: 
 Arguments about the merits and consequences of policy options for different types of 
individuals.  These arguments connect policies with individual self-interest3. 
 Arguments about the merits and consequences of policy options for different groups.  These 
arguments connect policies with an individual’s social identifications4.   
 Endorsements of policy options by politicians and political parties.  These endorsements 
serve to connect the policy options to political affiliations, like parties.   
 Policy frames that connect the policy to broader ideological values, such as conservatism or 
equality5. 
                                                     
2 Though not pertinent to the present study, it should be noted that individuals who rely exclusively on 
cues or who engage fully in cognitive processing occupy the endpoints of the elaboration likelihood 
continuum.  Most individuals fall somewhere along the continuum such that they utilize both 
arguments and cues to form their opinions.  However, it is possible to discriminate between attitude 
formation that results primarily from the peripheral route and attitudes formed using the central route.  
Although important to understand the underlying continuum, most research considers the processes 
operating at the endpoints (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). 
 
3 Self-interest is defined as an individual’s material interests.  These material interests are not limited 
to monetary resources like tax refunds, but can also include resources like health insurance or local 
infrastructure improvements.   
 
4 Social identifications are defined as groups to which individuals consider themselves members or 
affiliates.  These identifications include objective memberships like race and gender, as well as 
subjective memberships like political parties. 
 
5 Values are defined as abstract beliefs about how a person should behave and the ideal outcomes 
he or she should achieve.  Some examples of values in the political realm include ideology and 
equality. 
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Recall from the discussion of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) that individuals are 
likely to engage in cognitively oriented information processing, called central route processing, when 
they are able and motivated to think about the issue (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  In the realm of 
political decision-making, I propose that self-interest serves as a source of motivation that has 
consequences for information processing, attitudes, and behavior that are distinct from social 
identifications like party affiliation or values like ideology6.  Self-interest suggests that the policy issue 
carries significant consequences for the individual.  As self-interest increases, people will become 
more motivated to engage in the political environment.    
 The Integrated Model leads to two hypotheses designed to assess whether self-interested 
individuals are sending signals to policy makers on the issues that are relevant to them.  First, self-
interested individuals should demonstrate rational opinions on specific policies that emerge as a clear 
signal to policymakers.  To assess this hypothesis, I compare levels of attitude constraint among a 
set of specific health care policies. Attitude constraint means that individuals should recognize policy 
options that fit together (Converse 1964).  Previous studies suggest political elites outshine the mass 
public in the logical consistency of their political attitudes across policy domains (Converse 1964).    
The Integrated Model predicts that individuals with a self-interest in a policy should be motivated to 
cognitively engage with the political environment surrounding the issue that affects them.  As such, I 
expect that self-interested individuals will demonstrate a higher degree of attitude constraint among a 
number of specific policy proposals within the broader policy debate than individuals without an 
interest in the policy.   
 The second way that self-interested individuals can send signals to policymakers is to 
engage in behaviors such as interest group participation and other forms of activism that send signals 
that can help policymakers infer specific policy desires from the general signal they receive from the 
larger public. As described in the previous section, several studies suggest that self-interest may be 
                                                     
6 Individuals can be motivated to use central route processing for several reasons.  In addition to the 
motivation of self-interest (i.e. personal relevance) discussed in this project, another well researched 
motivation is an individual’s need for cognition.  Individuals high in need for cognition (NFC) enjoy 
engaging in effortful and analytic thinking (Cacioppo and Petty 1982).  Need for cognition is an 
individual difference variable that is rarely measured in political surveys.  Although not a direct proxy 
for NFC (Cacioppo et al. 1996), an individual’s education is controlled for in all analyses presented 
here.     
54 
 
more likely to affect behavior than attitudes.  By using the central processing route to form attitudes, 
the Integrated Model predicts that self-interested individuals will hold strong attitudes, which are more 
predictive of relevant behaviors (for a test of this mechanism, see Benz 2010).  I therefore expect that 
self-interested individuals will be most likely to engage in behaviors that policymakers can use to 
deduce public preferences such as interest organization participation and direct contact with 
politicians and policymakers.    
Data Sources 
 In this paper, I test these hypotheses using national survey data.  I use the case of health 
care reform as an example of a policy with tangible consequences for individuals.  The use of survey 
data often requires the researcher to make a decision about the self-interest of an individual 
respondent or category of people. However, I utilize data from the Kaiser Family Foundation Health 
Tracking polls from 2009 and 2010, which include a question that asks respondents to assess their 
own interest in health care reform.  The question has two useful features.  First, it provides a 
reasonable indicator of perceived self-interest.  Second, it allows analysis of the influence of self-
interest on policy attitudes and behaviors for a policy perceived to have a benefit or harm to the 
respondent.  The question reads, “Would you and your family be better off, worse off, or about the 
same if Congress passed health care reform?” Citations and question wordings from the surveys 
attained through the Roper Center are included in Appendix 3.A. 
In addition to the individual self-interest, the health care reform debate invokes value and 
social identification considerations as well. Much of the debate over a system of universal coverage 
revolves around the chance that the reform could lessen the overall effectiveness and efficiency of 
the system and value messages about a system of universal coverage are embodied in the rhetoric of 
big government and equality issues that are consistently present in the elite debate over the policy.   
Because health reform policies offer tangible benefits to the uninsured while simultaneously engaging 
political values and social identifications, the policy provides a reasonable test of the Integrated Model 
of Self-Interest.  
Social identification is operationalized as the respondent’s self-identification as a Democrat, 
Republican, or Independent. The omitted baseline category is for Independents, members of third 
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parties, and respondents unwilling to respond.  Party identification is selected as the relevant social 
identification because the parties have well known public stances on the issue of health care reform, 
especially the central issue of universal health care insurance.  
The dependent variables in the analyses include attitude questions on a number of specific 
health reform proposals and financing options, as well as self-reported engagement in a number of 
political behaviors such as interest group activity, contacting public officials, and participating in Town 
Hall meetings.   
To reduce the risk of omitted variable bias, I include controls for self-reported ideology, 
education, gender, race and ethnicity, employment status, and income.  All analyses are conducted 
on weighted data using the sample weights provided by the survey organization, which denote the 
inverse of the probability that the observation is included based on the sampling design.   
Findings 
 The first hypothesis states that self-interested individuals, those individuals with either a 
beneficial or negative interest, will demonstrate a higher degree of attitude constraint among specific 
policy proposals than those individuals without a self-interest in the issue. To measure attitude 
constraint, I identified three national surveys that asked a series of questions on preferences for 
specific health reform proposals (see Appendix A for specific question wording).  These surveys were 
fielded in 20097 and 2010 through the Kaiser Family Foundation Health Tracking Poll. Each question 
offered two to five possible response options.  Responses were recoded with higher values indicating 
more liberal views towards the issue.  Due to the nominal nature of the data for several questions, the 
measure of association reported is Cramer’s V, which provides a similar interpretation to a Pearson 
correlation coefficient, but accommodates non-continuous data.  Cramer’s V is computed by taking 
the square root of the chi-square statistic divided by the sample size and the length of the minimum 
dimension on the weighted data.    
 I hypothesize that self-interested individuals will exhibit more attitude constraint than those 
individuals without a self-interest in the issue.  In this case, I expect that those individuals with a self-
interest in health reform, either beneficial or negative, will be better able to arrange attitudes on 
                                                     
7 The September 2009 Kaiser Family Foundation Health Tracking Poll included a randomized split 
sample design, which affected several of the questions on specific health reform policy proposals.   
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specific health care reform proposals in ways that correspond logically to the other proposals.  In this 
case, to have Cramer’s V values closer to 1.0, which indicate higher degrees of consistency.  Tables 
3.1 and 3.2 present the Cramer’s V for each pair-wise combination of policies.  Table 3.3 provides the 
simple means, 95% confidence intervals, minimums, and maximums of the Cramer’s V statistics from 
the matrices presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for individuals with a beneficial interest, negative 
interest, and no interest in reform.   These averages demonstrate that individuals with a beneficial or 
negative interest in health reform show a stronger, more consistent pattern of attitude constraint in 
two of the three sets of survey questions.  The mean Cramer’s V for individuals with a beneficial or 
negative self-interest exceeds the mean for individuals without a self-interest by at least forty percent 
in the two surveys where a difference did exist.  
 Although attitude constraint is stronger for self-interested individuals, it is important to note that 
even for self-interested individuals the average levels of association are not overwhelmingly strong 
with an average Cramer’s V around the 0.30 mark.  This could potentially be due to the complex 
nature of these policy proposals.  For example, an uninsured individual might view proposals for an 
individual health insurance mandate and a public health insurance option quite favorably because 
both policies provide some sort of assistance for acquiring coverage.  Alternatively, an uninsured 
individual might strongly favor a public option and view an individual mandate as an unacceptable 
alternative to a pure guarantee of coverage.  In this way, the concept of attitude constraint may not be 
as clear within a single policy domain as it is across multiple policy domains.  Individual data points in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide some support for the complex nature of these associations.  For example, 
self-interested individuals, especially those who believe they will benefit from reform, show a higher 
degree of association between various coverage expansion policies and their willingness to pay for 
reform.  Additionally, in both panels of Table 3.1, the association between a public option and an 
individual mandate is higher for individuals who expect to be harmed by reform than those who 
expect to benefit from reform.  It seems quite plausible that someone who expects to be harmed by 
reform will dislike all policies that disrupt the status quo (high degree of association), while those who 
expect to benefit from reform may view a trade-off between the two policies (lower degree of 
association).   
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Table 3.1:  Attitude Constraint by Perceived Self­Interest in 2009 (Panel A) 
Beneficial Self­Interest  Individual Mandate  Public Option  Tax Credits  Medicare Expansion  Pre­existing Condition  Willingness to Pay 
Individual Mandate  1.00           
Public Option  0.44  1.00         
Tax Credits  0.25  0.22  1.00       
Medicare Expansion  0.35  0.42  0.30  1.00     
Pre­existing Condition  0.32  0.20  0.24  0.25  1.00   
Willingness to Pay  0.28  0.34  0.25  0.26  0.28  1.00 
Negative Self­Interest  Individual Mandate  Public Option  Tax Credits  Medicare Expansion  Pre­existing Condition  Willingness to Pay 
Individual Mandate  1.00           
Public Option  0.49  1.00         
Tax Credits  0.23  0.10  1.00       
Medicare Expansion  0.37  0.37  0.24  1.00     
Pre­existing Condition  0.32  0.33  0.07  0.35  1.00   
Willingness to Pay  0.33  0.18  0.15  0.11  0.14  1.00 
No Interest  Individual Mandate  Public Option  Tax Credits  Medicare Expansion  Pre­existing Condition  Willingness to Pay 
Individual Mandate  1.00           
Public Option  0.13  1.00         
Tax Credits  0.26  0.15  1.00       
Medicare Expansion  0.22  0.28  0.36  1.00     
Pre­existing Condition  0.31  0.18  0.09  0.19  1.00   
Willingness to Pay  0.07  0.16  ­0.05  0.02  0.23  1.00 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, September 2009, Form A 
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Table 3.1:  Attitude Constraint by Perceived Self­Interest in 2009 (Panel B) 
Beneficial 
Self­Interest 
Individual 
Mandate 
Medicaid/CHIP 
Expansion 
Single 
Payer 
Plan 
Employer 
Mandate 
Public 
Option 
Pre­
existing 
Condition 
Funding: 
Cigarette 
Tax 
Funding: 
Income 
Tax 
Funding: 
Soda Tax 
Funding: 
Alcohol 
Funding: 
Snack 
Tax 
Funding: 
Tax 
Code 
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company 
Fee 
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company 
Tax 
Individual 
Mandate  1.00                           
Medicaid/CHIP 
Expansion  0.44  1.00                         
Single Payer 
Plan  0.32  0.29  1.00                       
Employer 
Mandate  0.56  0.40  0.31  1.00                     
Public Option  0.39  0.32  0.53  0.36  1.00                   
Pre­existing 
Condition  0.32  0.27  0.13  0.36  0.20  1.00                 
Funding: 
Cigarette Tax  0.29  0.35  0.11  0.26  0.16  0.23  1.00               
Funding: 
Income Tax  0.33  0.29  0.26  0.41  0.31  0.28  0.24  1.00             
Funding: Soda 
Tax  0.31  0.25  0.11  0.24  0.11  0.30  0.54  0.27  1.00           
Funding: 
Alcohol  0.31  0.38  0.03  0.37  0.07  0.34  0.57  0.42  0.57  1.00         
Funding: 
Snack Tax  0.35  0.24  0.18  0.22  0.16  0.29  0.48  0.35  0.71  0.50  1.00       
Funding: Tax 
Code  0.32  0.26  0.23  0.42  0.38  0.23  0.26  0.64  0.22  0.37  0.29  1.00     
Funding: 
Insurance 
0.47  0.30  0.33  0.40  0.44  0.34  0.27  0.48  0.34  0.32  0.33  0.50  1.00   
  
 
59 
Company Fee 
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company Tax  0.40  0.34  0.27  0.43  0.42  0.36  0.27  0.60  0.27  0.38  0.33  0.59  0.64  1.00 
Negative Self­
Interest 
Individual 
Mandate 
Medicaid/CHIP 
Expansion 
Single 
Payer 
Plan 
Employer 
Mandate 
Public 
Option 
Pre­
existing 
Condition 
Funding: 
Cigarette 
Tax 
Funding: 
Income 
Tax 
Funding: 
Soda Tax 
Funding: 
Alcohol 
Funding: 
Snack 
Tax 
Funding: 
Tax 
Code 
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company 
Fee 
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company 
Tax 
Individual 
Mandate  1.00                           
Medicaid/CHIP 
Expansion  0.34  1.00                         
Single Payer 
Plan  0.17  0.23  1.00                       
Employer 
Mandate  0.39  0.41  0.25  1.00                     
Public Option  0.49  0.29  0.23  0.40  1.00                   
Pre­existing 
Condition  0.32  0.28  0.25  0.26  0.33  1.00                 
Funding: 
Cigarette Tax  0.17  0.18  0.07  0.14  0.25  0.00  1.00               
Funding: 
Income Tax  0.36  0.26  0.06  0.24  0.31  0.23  0.20  1.00             
Funding: Soda 
Tax  0.29  0.22  0.10  0.12  0.35  0.20  0.68  0.28  1.00           
Funding: 
Alcohol  0.08  0.31  0.04  0.05  0.09  0.06  0.45  0.12  0.51  1.00         
Funding: 
Snack Tax  0.26  0.28  0.05  0.13  0.29  0.12  0.51  0.22  0.69  0.38  1.00       
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Funding: Tax 
Code  0.11  0.34  0.18  0.12  0.28  0.17  0.16  0.47  0.30  0.25  0.31  1.00     
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company Fee  0.31  0.19  0.25  0.16  0.20  0.26  0.19  0.26  0.22  0.12  0.26  0.27  1.00   
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company Tax  0.29  0.34  0.29  0.28  0.34  0.17  0.33  0.31  0.34  0.43  0.35  0.45  0.49  1.00 
No Interest 
Individual 
Mandate 
Medicaid/CHIP 
Expansion 
Single 
Payer 
Plan 
Employer 
Mandate 
Public 
Option 
Pre­
existing 
Condition 
Funding: 
Cigarette 
Tax 
Funding: 
Income 
Tax 
Funding: 
Soda Tax 
Funding: 
Alcohol 
Funding: 
Snack 
Tax 
Funding: 
Tax 
Code 
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company 
Fee 
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company 
Tax 
Individual 
Mandate  1.00                           
Medicaid/CHIP 
Expansion  0.29  1.00                         
Single Payer 
Plan  0.17  0.10  1.00                       
Employer 
Mandate  0.23  0.24  0.16  1.00                     
Public Option  0.13  0.18  0.20  0.24  1.00                   
Pre­existing 
Condition  0.31  0.18  ­0.01  0.18  0.18  1.00                 
Funding: 
Cigarette Tax  ­0.07  0.06  ­0.01  0.11  0.16  0.00  1.00               
Funding: 
Income Tax  0.14  0.13  0.03  0.24  0.25  0.20  0.10  1.00             
Funding: Soda 
Tax  0.06  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.16  0.15  0.37  0.19  1.00           
Funding: 
­0.04  0.07  0.04  0.10  0.13  0.09  0.55  0.16  0.44  1.00       
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Alcohol 
Funding: 
Snack Tax  0.14  0.09  0.11  0.02  0.15  0.16  0.27  0.04  0.58  0.37  1.00       
Funding: Tax 
Code  ­0.07  0.01  0.16  0.13  ­0.08  ­0.12  0.07  0.11  0.04  0.13  ­0.05  1.00     
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company Fee  0.04  0.08  0.20  0.14  0.03  0.05  0.03  0.13  0.05  0.17  0.15  0.29  1.00   
Funding: 
Insurance 
Company Tax  0.07  0.10  0.14  0.19  0.27  0.16  0.25  0.14  0.26  0.16  0.29  0.16  0.28  1.00 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, September 2009, Form B 
Table 3.2:  Attitude Constraint by Perceived Self­Interest in 2010 
Beneficial Self­
Interest 
Insurance 
Reform 
Small 
Business 
Tax Credit 
Assistance 
to Purchase 
Medicare 
Donut 
Hole 
Expand 
Medicaid 
Children 
on Parent 
Plan 
Health 
Insurance 
Exchange 
Medicare 
Payments 
Malpractice 
Reform 
Selling 
Insurance 
across State 
Lines 
Expand 
High Risk 
Pools 
Medicare 
Commission 
Insurance 
Reform  1.00                       
Small Business 
Tax Credit  0.22  1.00                     
Assistance to 
Purchase  0.29  0.28  1.00                   
Medicare Donut 
Hole  0.37  0.35  0.45  1.00                 
Expand 
Medicaid  0.28  0.21  0.52  0.38  1.00               
Children on 
Parent Plan  0.23  0.25  0.34  0.30  0.26  1.00             
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Health 
Insurance 
Exchange  0.25  0.32  0.28  0.30  0.17  0.18  1.00           
Medicare 
Payments  0.24  0.15  0.29  0.28  0.33  0.22  0.21  1.00         
Malpractice 
Reform  0.18  0.18  0.00  0.06  ­0.02  0.10  0.14  0.06  1.00       
Selling 
Insurance 
across State 
Lines  0.18  0.23  ­0.02  ­0.02  0.00  ­0.02  0.23  ­0.10  0.32  1.00     
Expand High 
Risk Pools  0.34  0.27  0.40  0.32  0.25  0.26  0.24  0.19  0.13  0.19  1.00   
Medicare 
Commission  0.25  0.21  0.33  0.30  0.31  0.20  0.25  0.31  0.14  ­0.03  0.18  1.00 
              
              
Negative Self­
Interest 
Insurance 
Reform 
Small 
Business 
Tax Credit 
Assistance 
to Purchase 
Medicare 
Donut 
Hole 
Expand 
Medicaid 
Children 
on Parent 
Plan 
Health 
Insurance 
Exchange 
Medicare 
Payments 
Malpractice 
Reform 
Selling 
Insurance 
across State 
Lines 
Expand 
High Risk 
Pools 
Medicare 
Commission 
Insurance 
Reform  1.00                       
Small Business 
Tax Credit  0.39  1.00                     
Assistance to 
Purchase  0.25  0.36  1.00                   
Medicare Donut 
Hole  0.32  0.32  0.24  1.00                 
Expand 
0.28  0.32  0.50  0.30  1.00               
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Medicaid 
Children on 
Parent Plan  0.17  0.23  0.19  0.18  0.24  1.00             
Health 
Insurance 
Exchange  0.24  0.39  0.33  0.20  0.28  0.24  1.00           
Medicare 
Payments  0.19  0.20  0.30  0.27  0.28  0.22  0.15  1.00         
Malpractice 
Reform  0.08  0.19  0.04  0.08  0.02  0.06  0.23  0.04  1.00       
Selling 
Insurance 
across State 
Lines  0.09  0.10  0.17  0.10  0.15  0.18  0.32  0.11  0.17  1.00     
Expand High 
Risk Pools  0.32  0.32  0.39  0.39  0.44  0.24  0.33  0.24  0.11  0.24  1.00   
Medicare 
Commission  0.24  0.29  0.39  0.28  0.40  0.21  0.34  0.33  0.14  0.18  0.36  1.00 
                        
No Interest 
Insurance 
Reform 
Small 
Business 
Tax Credit 
Assistance 
to Purchase 
Medicare 
Donut 
Hole 
Expand 
Medicaid 
Children 
on Parent 
Plan 
Health 
Insurance 
Exchange 
Medicare 
Payments 
Malpractice 
Reform 
Selling 
Insurance 
across State 
Lines 
Expand 
High Risk 
Pools 
Medicare 
Commission 
Insurance 
Reform  1.00                       
Small Business 
Tax Credit  0.24  1.00                     
Assistance to 
Purchase  0.26  0.39  1.00                   
Medicare Donut 
0.29  0.27  0.36  1.00                 
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Hole 
Expand 
Medicaid  0.14  0.29  0.45  0.32  1.00               
Children on 
Parent Plan  0.19  0.26  0.26  0.19  0.32  1.00             
Health 
Insurance 
Exchange  0.26  0.42  0.26  0.20  0.15  0.16  1.00           
Medicare 
Payments  0.12  0.24  0.23  0.23  0.34  0.27  0.12  1.00         
Malpractice 
Reform  0.14  0.20  0.04  0.09  0.13  0.09  0.17  0.17  1.00       
Selling 
Insurance 
across State 
Lines  0.18  0.19  0.18  0.10  0.24  0.17  0.27  0.26  0.18  1.00     
Expand High 
Risk Pools  0.32  0.30  0.35  0.33  0.33  0.15  0.27  0.23  0.10  0.22  1.00   
Medicare 
Commission  0.20  0.29  0.23  0.18  0.31  0.21  0.19  0.35  0.24  0.26  0.19  1.00 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, February 2010 
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Table 3.3: Average, Minimum, and Maximum Inter-attitude Associations by Self-Interest 
 2009 from Table 1A 2009 from Table 1B 2010 from Table 2 
Beneficial Self-Interest 
Average  
95% CI 
(min/max) 
0.29 
(0.26-0.33) 
(0.20, 0.44) 
0.34 
(0.31-0.37) 
(0.02, 0.71) 
0.22 
(0.19-0.25) 
(-0.10, 0.52) 
Negative Self-Interest  
Average  
95% CI 
(min/max) 
0.25 
(0.19-0.31) 
(0.07, 0.49) 
0.26 
(0.23-0.29) 
(0.00, 0.69) 
0.24 
(0.21-0.26) 
(0.02, 0.50) 
No Self-Interest 
Average  
95% CI 
(min/max) 
0.17 
(0.12-0.23) 
(-0.05, 0.36) 
0.14 
(0.12-0.16) 
(-0.12, 0.58) 
0.23 
(0.21-0.25) 
(0.04, 0.45) 
 
 The second hypothesis leads to the expectation that self-interested individuals will be most 
likely to engage in behaviors that policymakers can use to deduce public preferences such as interest 
organization participation and direct contact with politicians and policymakers.  Table 3.4 provides the 
distributions for the six political behaviors that serve as the dependent variables in the analysis.  
Consistent with studies of political activity and rates reported on large surveys such as the National 
Election Studies, rates of self-reported behavior are relatively low ranging from 10% for participation 
with an issue organization and a high of 37% for trying to influence the opinions of family and friends. 
To test this hypothesis, I run a series of logit models to test the influence of self-interest on six 
different dependent variables that measure a respondent’s self-reported behavior in relation to the 
health reform issue controlling for party identification, ideology, and demographic characteristics8.   
These behaviors include contacting a public official, issue organization activity, contacting a media 
outlet, trying to influence opinions of family or friends, attending a town hall meeting or other public 
forum, and contributing money.  Again, self-interest is measured as the respondent’s perception of 
whether health reform will benefit, harm, or have no effect for them and their family.  The omitted 
                                                     
8 Due to the fact that the political behaviors may be related to each other, and therefore, the error 
terms in these six equations may be correlated, I also conducted a seemingly unrelated regression 
using the mvprobit command in STATA.  The results, included in Appendix 3.B, provide the same 
substantive interpretation in terms of the coefficients’ direction, magnitude, and significance, with the 
exception that the coefficient on “harm from reform” reaches significance (p<.05) in the media contact 
model and approaches significance (p=.13) in the model of Town Hall meeting/public forum 
participation. Similarly, the coefficient on “Republican” reaches significance (p<.05) in the model of 
issue organization activity and approaches significance (p=.09) in the model of contributing money. 
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category in the model is individuals reporting no effect of reform.  Therefore, I expect a positive and 
significant influence of beneficial and negative self-interest on behaviors compared to individuals 
without an interest at all.   
Table 3.4:  Baseline Distribution of Political Behavior Variables 
During the past six months, have 
you personally done any of the 
following things in connection 
with the health care reform 
issue? Proportion 
Standard 
Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Contact Public Official   
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 No 0.80 0.01 0.77 0.82 
 Yes 0.20 0.01 0.18 0.23 
Issue Organization Activity    
 No 0.90 0.01 0.88 0.92 
 Yes 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.12 
Media Contact     
 No 0.87 0.01 0.85 0.90 
 Yes 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.15 
Influence Opinion     
 No 0.63 0.02 0.60 0.66 
 Yes 0.37 0.02 0.34 0.40 
Town Hall Meeting/Public Forum    
 No 0.87 0.01 0.85 0.89 
 Yes 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.15 
Contribute Money     
 No 0.88 0.01 0.85 0.90 
 Yes 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.15 
 
The coefficients on the benefit from reform self-interest variable are positive and significant in 
five of the six models as shown in Table 3.5.  The coefficients on the harm from reform self-interest 
variable are positive and significant in four of the six models.  A Wald test confirms that the joint effect 
of the self-interest variables is significant in all of the models except the model of participation in a 
town hall meeting or other discussion forum.  Furthermore, the effect of self-interest for those who 
expect to benefit from health reform does not differ significantly from those who expect to be harmed 
by reform.   
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Table 3.5: Effects of Self-Interest on Political Behavior 
 Contacted Public Official Activity with Health Issue 
Organization 
Contacted Media Outlet 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. 
Err. 
P>|t| 
Benefit from 
Reform 
0.811 0.239 0.001 1.154 0.335 0.001 0.681 0.280 0.015 
Harm from 
Reform 
0.874 0.239 0.000 1.036 0.403 0.010 0.413 0.301 0.171 
Joint Effect of 
Self-Interest 
(F) 
16.27  .0001 11.51  .001 4.65  .031 
Democrat 0.343 0.224 0.127 0.967 0.306 0.002 0.212 0.286 0.457 
Republican -0.128 0.241 0.596 0.588 0.363 0.105 0.614 0.359 0.087 
Joint Effect of 
Partisanship 
(F) 
0.29  .592 8.06  .005 2.23  .136 
Education 0.678 0.121 0.000 0.462 0.171 0.007 0.429 0.138 0.002 
Male -0.255 0.189 0.177 -0.045 0.254 0.858 -0.109 0.234 0.640 
White 0.444 0.256 0.083 -0.150 0.292 0.607 -0.146 0.279 0.601 
Income 0.003 0.048 0.958 -0.026 0.058 0.661 -0.001 0.060 0.988 
Age 0.022 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.738 -0.006 0.008 0.428 
Unemployed 0.131 0.351 0.708 -0.015 0.465 0.974 -0.816 0.502 0.105 
Constant -5.243 0.581 0.000 -4.746 0.714 0.000 -3.224 0.654 0.000 
N 942   942   942   
Model F-
Statistic 
7.73  0.000 3.81  0.000 3.73  0.000 
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Table 3.5 
(con’t) 
Tried to Influence 
Opinions 
Participated in 
Forum/Town Hall Meeting 
Contributed Money 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
Benefit from 
Reform 
0.462 0.211 0.029 0.059 0.275 0.830 0.703 0.294 0.017 
Harm from 
Reform 
0.691 0.216 0.001 0.272 0.298 0.362 0.569 0.310 0.067 
Joint Effect of 
Self-Interest 
(F) 
10.05  .002 0.45  .504 5.58  .018 
Democrat 0.419 0.199 0.035 0.675 0.288 0.019 0.589 0.295 0.046 
Republican 0.008 0.231 0.971 0.129 0.310 0.677 0.467 0.320 0.146 
Joint Effect of 
Partisanship 
(F) 
1.43  .232 2.33  .128 3.70  .055 
Education 0.272 0.097 0.005 0.166 0.136 0.224 0.518 0.141 0.000 
Male -0.204 0.167 0.223 -0.310 0.231 0.179 -0.159 0.233 0.496 
White -0.035 0.206 0.866 0.645 0.270 0.017 0.196 0.300 0.513 
Income 0.016 0.046 0.734 -0.009 0.058 0.876 -0.060 0.060 0.318 
Age 0.008 0.005 0.121 -0.011 0.007 0.102 0.006 0.008 0.402 
Unemployed 0.088 0.295 0.766 0.307 0.402 0.445 0.051 0.437 0.906 
Constant -2.057 0.462 0.000 -2.489 0.588 0.000 -4.331 0.729 0.000 
N 942   942   942   
Model F-
Statistic 
2.78  0.000 2.38  0.000 3.88  0.000 
 
To provide a better sense of the influence of self-interest on these political behaviors, Figure 
3.1 provides the predicted probability of the self-reported political behaviors which are all plausible 
ways that self-interested individuals might send signals to policy makers given self-interest and 
holding all other values at their median or modal values.  As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, having a 
beneficial or negative self-interest increases the predicted probability of engaging in these behaviors, 
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and nearly doubles the predicted probability of some activities such as contacting public officials and 
participation with a health interest organization. 
Figure 3.1: Predicted Probability of Political Behaviors Given Self-Interest  
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Also of note is the more consistent effect of self-interest compared to partisanship 
considering how the public account of Obama’s health care reform efforts were framed in partisan 
terms.  Compared to the omitted baseline category for independents, third party affiliates, and those 
unwilling to respond, the effect of identifying as a Democrat is positive and significant in four of the six 
models of political behavior and the effect of identifying as a Republican is positive and significant in 
only one of the six models.  A Wald test of the joint effect of partisanship is significant only for the 
models of interest organization activity and contributions.     
Discussion 
 The results presented in the case of health care reform provide support for the hypotheses 
derived from the Integrated Model of Self-Interest that individuals with an interest in a policy are 
capable of sending signals that policymakers can use to infer specific preferences from the public’s 
general policy mood.  Individuals who perceived either a beneficial or negative interest in health care 
reform policies were more likely to demonstrate attitude constraint than individuals who felt they 
would be neither helped nor harmed by reforms.  They were also more likely to engage in political 
behaviors designed to influence the health care reform debate.   
 In addition to investigating these hypotheses, the data utilized in this study provide an 
opportunity to examine the performance of the Integrated Model of Self-Interest for individuals whose 
interest is motivated by negative consequences of reform.  Prior tests of the Integrated Model have 
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examined the influence of self-interest on attitudes and behaviors only for individuals who stand to 
gain something from a policy proposal.  This study directly compared the influence of self-interest for 
those individuals who stand to gain from health care reform with those who stand to lose and those 
with no interest at all.  In terms of attitude constraint and political behavior, the results presented 
indicate no differences between the two forms of self-interest.  While prior studies have examined the 
effect of self-interest for both policies with beneficial and negative consequences, these studies have 
not compared the two forms of interest directly for the same policy.   
 The study provides evidence that self-interested individuals demonstrate attitude constraint 
across specific policies and engage in activities designed to reveal their preferences to policymakers.  
In this way, self-interested individuals are capable of sending signals to policymakers.  The next 
logical questions are whether policymakers receive these signals, and if so, do they act upon them?  
Answers to these questions will require a nuanced examination of the mass-elite dynamic within a 
policy domain to determine which policies are being advocated by groups of self-interested 
individuals, how those preferences compare to the preferences of other groups, and how 
policymakers act or do not act in response.   
 
 
Appendix 1.A:  Question Wordings 
* GALLUP/CNN/USA TODAY POLL # 1993-322055:  MAY SURVEY, WAVE 1 [computer file]. 
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Study USAIPOCNUS1993-322055 Version 2. Gallup 
Organization [producer], 1993. Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 
University of Connecticut [distributor], 2008. 
Dependent Variable 
Which of the following do you think is the most important change that needs to take place in health 
care: Providing health insurance for those that cannot now afford it, or, Controlling your health care 
costs so they don’t rise so fast in the future? 
Self-Interest 
Are you currently covered by health insurance, or not? 
Symbolic Beliefs 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as: (A Democrat, A Republican, An Independent, 
Or What)? 
Sociotropic Perceptions 
None. 
 
* Stony Brook Poll # 2004-HLTHB: Health Pulse of America 5 [computer file]. Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research Study USSTONYB2004-HLTHB. Stony Brook University Center for 
Survey Research [producer], 2004. Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 
University of Connecticut [distributor], 2004. 
Dependent Variable 
Do you think the government should KEEP the recent tax cut in order to stimulate the economy, 
REPEAL tax cuts for the MOST WEALTHY to expand health insurance coverage, or should the 
government repeal ALMOST ALL of the tax cut to expand health insurance coverage? 
Self-Interest 
Are you personally covered by a health insurance plan right now, including Medicare or Medicaid? 
Symbolic Beliefs 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as: (A Democrat, A Republican, An Independent, 
Or What)? 
In general, when it comes to politics, do you think of yourself as a liberal, a moderate, or a 
conservative? 
Sociotropic Perceptions 
None. 
 
* Kaiser Family Foundation and USA Today. ABC News/Kaiser/USA Today Poll # 2006-1021: 
Health Care Costs and Issues [computer file]. 1st Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 
version. Storrs, CT: The Roper Center, University of Connecticut [distributor], 2006. 
Dependent Variable 
Which would you prefer – (the current health insurance system in the United States, in which most 
people get their health insurance from private employers, but some people have no insurance) or (a 
universal health insurance program, in which everyone is covered under a program like Medicare 
that’s run by the government and financed by taxpayers)? 
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Self-Interest 
Do you have some form of health insurance or health care coverage, or not? 
Symbolic Beliefs 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as: (A Democrat, A Republican, An Independent, 
Or What)? 
Would you say your views on most political matters are liberal, moderate, or conservative? 
Sociotropic Perceptions 
Thinking now about the number of Americans who have no health insurance – do you think that’s (a 
critical problem for the country, a serious problem but not a critical one, a problem but not serious, or 
not much of a problem at all)?   
 
* KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION POLL # 2008-HNI072:  SEPTEMBER KAISER HEALTH 
TRACKING POLL--HEALTH CARE/HEALTH INSURANCE [computer file]. Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research Study USPSRA2008-HNI072 Version 2. Princeton Survey Research 
Associates International [producer], 2008. Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion 
Research, University of Connecticut [distributor], 2009. 
Dependent Variable 
Which would you prefer – (the current health insurance system in the United States, in which most 
people get their health insurance from private employers, but some people have no insurance); or (a 
universal health insurance program, in which everyone is covered under a program like Medicare 
that’s run by the government and financed by taxpayers?) 
Self-Interest 
Are you, yourself, now covered by any form of health insurance or health plan or do you not have 
health insurance at this time?   
Symbolic Beliefs 
In politics today, do you consider yourself a [ROTATE: Republican, Democrat/ 
Democrat, Republican], an Independent, or what? 
Would you say your views in most political matters are liberal, moderate or conservative? 
Sociotropic Perceptions 
None. 
 
* KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION: SEPTEMBER KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL—HEALTH 
CARE REFORM [computer file]. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Study 
USPSRA2009-HNI079 Version 2. Princeton Survey Research Associates International 
[producer], 2009. Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of 
Connecticut [distributor], 2010. 
Dependent Variable 
Now I'm going to read you some different ways to increase the number of Americans covered by 
health insurance.  As I read each one, please tell me whether you would favor it or oppose it.   
Here’s the (first/next) one – (INSERT AND RANDOMIZE).  Do you favor or oppose this?   
(GET ANSWER THEN ASK: Is that strongly favor/oppose or somewhat favor/oppose?)  
a. Requiring all Americans to have health insurance, either from their employer or from another 
source, with financial help for those who can’t afford it   
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ASK ITEMS b-d OF FORM A:  
b Creating a government- administered public health insurance option similar to Medicare to compete 
with private health insurance plans  
c. Offering tax credits to help people buy private health insurance  
d. Expanding Medicare to cover people between the ages of 55 and 64 who do not have health 
insurance   
ASK ITEMS e-h OF FORM B:  
e. Expanding state government programs for low-income people, such as Medicaid and the  
Children’s Health Insurance Program  
f. Having a national health plan – or single-payer plan – in which all Americans would get their 
insurance from a single government plan   
g. Requiring employers to offer health insurance to their workers or pay money into a government 
fund that will pay to cover those without insurance   
h. Creating a government- administered public health insurance option to compete with private health 
insurance plans  
Self-Interest 
Are you, yourself, now covered by any form of health insurance or health plan or do you not have 
health insurance at this time?  
Symbolic Beliefs 
In politics today, do you consider yourself a [ROTATE: Republican, Democrat/Democrat, Republican], 
an Independent, or what? 
Would you say your views on most political matters are liberal, moderate, or conservative? 
Sociotropic Perceptions 
Do you think the country as a whole would be (better off) or (worse off) if the president and Congress 
passed health care reform, or don’t you think it would make much difference? 
 
* KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION POLL: FEBRUARY KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL--
HEALTH CARE REFORM [computer file]. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Study 
USPSRA2010-HNI084 Version 2. Princeton Survey Research Associates International 
[producer], 2010. Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of 
Connecticut [distributor], 2010. 
Dependent Variable 
As of right now, do you generally (support) or generally (oppose) the health care proposals being 
discussed in Congress? [ROTATE VERBIAGE IN PARENS] (GET ANSWER THEN ASK: Is that 
strongly support/oppose or somewhat support/oppose?)  
If a candidate for Congress (supports/opposes) health care reform legislation, would that make you 
(MORE) likely to vote for him or her, (LESS) likely to vote for him or her, or wouldn’t it make much 
difference in your vote?  
Self-Interest 
Are you, yourself, now covered by any form of health insurance or health plan or do you not have 
health insurance at this time?  
Symbolic Beliefs 
In politics today, do you consider yourself a [ROTATE: Republican, Democrat/Democrat, Republican], 
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an Independent, or what? 
Would you say your views on most political matters are liberal, moderate, or conservative? 
Sociotropic Perceptions 
Do you think the country as a whole would be (better off) or (worse off) if the president and Congress 
passed health care reform, or don’t you think it would make much difference? 
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Appendix 2.A: Treatment Conditions and Questionnaire Items 
Experiment A Strong Arguments 
Recently, a group of  [R STATE] state legislators/legislators in a Midwestern state] convened a 
meeting to develop policies to help get the state out of its recession.  [DEMOCRATS/REPUBLICANS] 
overwhelmingly favored a policy that includes sending every adult in [R STATE/the Midwestern state] 
a one-time stimulus check for $200.  In a statement released to the press, the 
[DEMOCRATS/REPUBLICANS] offered the following reasons for why they support this policy.    
  
Stimulus checks were used in thirty-eight states during the last recession.  A rigorous study 
conducted by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office showed that states using stimulus checks 
recovered 40% faster from the recession compared to states that did not.    
  
Expert economists using data from other recessions predict that 80% of the stimulus money will be 
spent on new goods and services.  This type of spending cycle increases consumer well being, 
increases government revenues for future spending, and keeps the prices of goods and services 
down.  
  
The National Association of Accounting Professionals says that financial incentives like the stimulus 
checks work to boost consumer confidence in the economy so that people begin to make major 
purchases again.    
 
Given these reasons, do you support or oppose the adoption of this stimulus check policy in [your 
state/the Midwestern state]?  
1. Strongly support  
2. Somewhat support  
3. Neither support or oppose  
4. Somewhat oppose  
5. Strongly oppose  
 
Experiment A Weak Arguments 
Recently, a group of  [R STATE] state legislators/legislators in a Midwestern state] convened a 
meeting to develop policies to help get the state out of its recession.  [DEMOCRATS/REPUBLICANS] 
overwhelmingly favored a policy that includes sending every adult in [R STATE/the Midwestern state] 
a one-time stimulus check for $200.  In a statement released to the press, the 
[DEMOCRATS/REPUBLICANS] offered the following reasons for why they support this policy.    
 
A study conducted by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office noted that stimulus checks were one of 
the cheapest and easiest policies used by the states during the last recession.  
One state legislator commented during the meeting, “we might as well give it a shot.”    
  
The economists advising the legislators created models predicting that somewhere between 30% and 
80% of the stimulus money will be spent to purchase new items and services.  The economists say 
that the stimulus checks will only help the economy if spending is closer to 80%, but they do not know 
what will happen for sure.    
  
Even if people do not spend the stimulus money on goods and services, there is a chance that the 
stimulus money will boost consumer confidence.   No one can be sure, but if the stimulus checks 
work to boost consumer confidence, people might make major purchases again.   
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Given these reasons, do you support or oppose the adoption of this stimulus check policy in [your 
state/the Midwestern state]?  
1. Strongly support  
2. Somewhat support  
3. Neither support or oppose  
4. Somewhat oppose  
5. Strongly oppose  
 
Experiment B 
Recently, a group of  [R STATE] state legislators/legislators in a Midwestern state] convened a 
meeting to develop policies to help get the state out of its recession.  Some legislators favored a 
policy that includes sending every adult in [R STATE/the Midwestern state] a one-time stimulus check 
for $200.   
 
Do you support or oppose the adoption of this stimulus check policy in [your state/the Midwestern 
state]?  
1. Strongly support  
2. Somewhat support  
3. Neither support or oppose  
4. Somewhat oppose  
5. Strongly oppose 
Thinking about this same policy of stimulus checks, please read the following statement issued  
by a prominent [Democrat/Republican] in [R STATE’s/the Midwestern state’s] legislature.    
  
After great consideration of the terrible recession facing our state, I join my fellow Democrats in 
recommending a policy in which every adult in our state will receive a $200 stimulus check.  I offer the 
following reasons for this recommendation:  
  
Stimulus checks were used in thirty-eight states during the last recession.  A rigorous study 
conducted by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office showed that states using stimulus checks 
recovered 40% faster from the recession compared to states that did not.    
  
Expert economists using data from other recessions predict that 80% of the stimulus money will be 
spent on new goods and services.  This type of spending cycle increases consumer well being, 
increases government revenues for future spending, and keeps the prices of goods and services 
down.  
  
The National Association of Accounting Professionals says that financial incentives like the stimulus 
checks work to boost consumer confidence in the economy so that people begin to make major 
purchases again.    
  
I hope I can count on your support for this policy.    
  
Many people change their opinions once they have more information to form an opinion.  Now that 
you have some additional information on the policy, we would like to collect your opinion about the 
stimulus checks again.  We are interested in your honest opinion after reading the statement from this 
[Democratic/Republican] legislator in your state.    
  
Given the new information, do you support or oppose the adoption of this stimulus check policy  
in [your state/the Midwestern state]?  
1. Strongly support  
2. Somewhat support  
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3. Neither support or oppose  
4. Somewhat oppose  
5. Strongly oppose  
 
Other Outcome Measures 
How important is this stimulus check issue to you personally? 
1. Extremely important 
2. Very important 
3. Somewhat important 
4. Not too important 
5. Not at all important 
 
How sure are you of your opinions on this stimulus check issue? 
1. Extremely sure 
2. Very sure 
3. Somewhat sure 
4. Slightly sure 
5. Not at all sure 
 
How much conflict do you feel about the good and bad aspects of the stimulus check issue? 
1. A lot of conflict 
2. Some conflict 
3. A little conflict 
4. Not very much conflict 
5. No conflict at all 
 
Are you willing to be contacted by an organization that shares your view on the stimulus check issue? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Do you think you will contribute money to an organization that shares your view on the stimulus check 
issue? 
1. Yes, I probably will  
2. No, probably not 
 
Do you think you will write a letter or email to a public official expressing your views about this 
stimulus check issue? 
1. Yes, I probably will 
2. No, probably not 
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Respondent Demographics 
Gender Male  Female                     
                        
% 46.9 
(1.99) 
53.1 
(1.99) 
                   
Race White  Black  Hispanic  Asian  Native 
American 
Mixed  Other           
                        
% 71.3 
(2.05) 
11.7 
(1.52) 
8.7 
(1.34) 
2.7 
(0.86) 
1.4 
(0.57) 
1.2 
(0.45) 
3.0 
(0.86) 
         
Education No High 
School 
High 
School 
Graduate 
Some 
College 
2­Year 
Degree 
4­Year 
Degree 
Post­
Graduate 
           
                        
% 12.6 
(1.80) 
30.6 
(1.75) 
24.4 
(1.58) 
5.9 
(0.78) 
16.8 
(1.47) 
9.7 
(1.10) 
           
Income less than 
$20,000 
$20,000 ­ 
$24,999 
$25,000 ­ 
$29,999 
$30,000 ­ 
$39,999 
$40,000 ­ 
$49,999 
$50,000 ­ 
$59,999 
$70,000 ­ 
$79,999 
$80,000 ­ 
$99,999 
$100,000 ­ 
$119,999 
$120,000 ­ 
$149,999 
$150,000 
+  
Refused 
                        
% 16.1  6.3  5.9  10.6  10.9  11.0  8.1  7.7  5.6  4.3  4.6  9.0 
 (1.05)  (0.95)  (1.00)  (1.20)  (1.22)  (1.22)  (0.90)  (1.05)  (0.77)  (0.62)  (0.69)  (1.1) 
Note: Standard Errors presented in parentheses.
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Appendix 3.A: Survey Information and Question Wordings 
 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION POLL: SEPTEMBER KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL--
HEALTH CARE REFORM [computer file]. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Study 
USPSRA2009-HNI079. Princeton Survey Research Associates International [producer], 2009. 
Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut 
[distributor], 2009. 
 
Do you think (INSERT AND RANDOMIZE. ALWAYS ASK A and B FIRST) would be (better off) or 
(worse off) if the president and Congress passed health care reform, or don’t you think it would make 
much difference? (ROTATE VERBIAGE IN PARENTHESES) [READ IF NECESSARY: “Would 
(ITEM) be better off or worse off if the president and Congress passed health care reform, or don’t 
you think it would make much difference?] 
a. You and your family  
 
Now I'm going to read you some different ways to increase the number of Americans covered by  
health insurance.  As I read each one, please tell me whether you would favor it or oppose it.   
Here’s the (first/next) one – (INSERT AND RANDOMIZE).  Do you favor or oppose this?   
(GET ANSWER THEN ASK: Is that strongly favor/oppose or somewhat favor/oppose?)  
 ASK ITEM a OF ALL:  
a. Requiring all Americans to have health insurance, either from their employer or from 
another source, with financial help for those who can’t afford it   
ASK ITEMS b-d OF FORM A:  
b [SPLIT FORM WORDING EXPERIMENT WITH ITEM H] Creating a government-
administered public health insurance option similar to Medicare to compete with private 
health insurance plans  
c. Offering tax credits to help people buy private health insurance  
d. Expanding Medicare to cover people between the ages of 55 and 64 who do not have 
health insurance   
ASK ITEMS e-h OF FORM B:  
e. Expanding state government programs for low-income people, such as Medicaid and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program  
f. Having a national health plan – or single-payer plan – in which all Americans would get 
their insurance from a single government plan   
g. Requiring employers to offer health insurance to their workers or pay money into a 
government fund that will pay to cover those without insurance   
h. [SPLIT FORM WORDING EXPERIMENT WITH ITEM B] Creating a government-
administered public health insurance option to compete with private health insurance plans  
{careful with trend here}  
 
Do you favor or oppose the federal government requiring health insurance companies to cover 
anyone who applies, even if they have a prior illness? (GET ANSWER THEN ASK : Is that strongly or 
somewhat favor/oppose?) 
 
ASK FORM A ONLY  Would you be willing to pay more—either in higher health insurance premiums 
or higher taxes—in order to increase the number of Americans who have health insurance, or not? 
 
ASK FORM B ONLY  Please tell me if you would favor or oppose each of the following to help pay for 
health care reform and provide coverage for more of the uninsured.  How about (INSERT AND  
RANDOMIZE)?   
 (ALWAYS READ FIRST TIME, AND REPEAT IF NECESSARY: Would you favor or oppose this to 
help pay for health care reform and provide coverage for more of the uninsured?)  
(GET ANSWER THEN ASK: Is that strongly favor/oppose or somewhat favor/oppose?)  
a. Increasing the cigarette tax  
b. Increasing income taxes for people from families making more than $350,000 a year and 
individuals making more than $280,000  
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c. Increasing taxes on soda and sugary soft drinks  
d. Increasing taxes on alcohol, wine and beer  
e. Increasing taxes on unhealthy snack foods  
f. Limiting the amount of money higher income people can deduct from their taxes when they 
make contributions to charities  
g. Having health insurance companies pay a fee based on how much business they have  
h. Having health insurance companies pay a tax for offering very expensive policies 
 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION POLL: DECEMBER KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 
[computer file]. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Study USPSRA2009-HNI082. 
Princeton Survey Research Associates International [producer], 2009. Storrs, CT: The Roper 
Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut [distributor], 2009. 
 
Do you think (INSERT AND RANDOMIZE. ALWAYS ASK A and B FIRST) would be (better off) or 
(worse off) if the president and Congress passed health care reform, or don’t you think it would make 
much difference? (ROTATE VERBIAGE IN PARENTHESES) [READ IF NECESSARY: “Would 
(ITEM) be better off or worse off if the president and Congress passed health care reform, or don’t 
you think it would make much difference?] 
a. You and your family  
 
During the past six months, have you personally done any of the following things in connection with 
the health care reform issue? First, have you (INSERT AND RANDOMIZE), or not? 
a. written to, emailed or spoken with your representative or another public official? 
b. joined or became more active in a health-care related organization? 
c. written to, emailed or called a newspaper, website, radio or television station? 
d. tried to influence a friend or family member's opinion? 
e. participated in a forum or town meeting having to do with health care reform? 
f. personally contributed money to a political candidate or organization because of its 
positions on health care reform {was free-standing item in 1994} 
 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION POLL: FEBRUARY KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL--
HEALTH CARE REFORM [computer file]. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Study 
USPSRA2010-HNI084 Version 2. Princeton Survey Research Associates International 
[producer], 2010. Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of 
Connecticut [distributor], 2010. 
 
Do you think (INSERT AND RANDOMIZE. ALWAYS ASK A and B FIRST) would be (better off) or 
(worse off) if the president and Congress passed health care reform, or don’t you think it would make 
much difference? (ROTATE VERBIAGE IN PARENTHESES) [READ IF NECESSARY: “Would 
(ITEM) be better off or worse off if the president and Congress passed health care reform, or don’t 
you think it would make much difference?] 
a. You and your family 
 
For each element of health care reform I name, please tell me how important it is that this be passed 
into law. First, how important is (INSERT AND RANDOMIZE)?  Is that extremely important, very 
important, somewhat important, not too important, or should it not be done at all?   
Next, how important is (INSERT NEXT ITEM)? READ IF NECESSARY: Extremely important, very 
important, somewhat important, not too important, or should it not be done at all? {new}   
a.  Reforming the way health insurance works, for example, so that insurance companies 
can’t deny coverage based on pre-existing conditions, and can’t cap the benefits people get 
over their lifetime  
b.  Providing tax credits to small businesses to encourage them to offer coverage to their 
employees   
c.  Providing financial help to lower and middle income Americans who don’t get insurance 
through their jobs to help them purchase coverage  
d.  Helping close the Medicare “donut hole” or “coverage gap” so seniors would no longer 
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have a period where they are responsible for paying the full cost of their medicines   
e.  Expanding the existing Medicaid program to cover more low-income uninsured Americans   
f.  Allowing children to stay on their parents’ insurance plans through age 25  
g.  Creating a health insurance exchange or marketplace where small businesses and people 
who don’t get coverage through their jobs can shop for insurance and compare prices and 
benefits  
h.  Limiting future increases in Medicare payments to health care providers as a way to help 
pay for health reform  
i.  Limiting the amount of money that patients can collect in medical malpractice lawsuits  
j.   Allowing health insurers to sell health insurance policies across state lines  
k.  Expanding high risk insurance pools to cover people who have an illness that makes it 
hard to buy insurance in the regular market  
l.  Establishing a new Medicare Commission to recommend policies that reduce cost growth 
in  
Medicare  
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Appendix 3.B:  Results from Seemingly Unrelated Regression of Political Behavior 
N = 942                 
 Wald chi2(60) = 223.0, p<.001               
Contact Public Official Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z|    Influence Opinion Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z| 
Benefit from Reform  0.4719315  0.1387935  0.001    Benefit from Reform  0.3020779  0.1323959  0.023 
Harm from Reform  0.5107403  0.1353364  0.000    Harm from Reform  0.4711982  0.1340152  0.000 
Democrat  0.193607  0.1306708  0.138    Democrat  0.2951738  0.1243456  0.018 
Republican  ­0.003542  0.1328504  0.979    Republican  0.054252  0.1422329  0.703 
Education  0.421912  0.0692258  0.000    Education  0.1765174  0.059631  0.003 
Male  ­0.1271293  0.1081865  0.24    Male  ­0.1368402  0.1037762  0.187 
White  0.2546535  0.1498812  0.089    White  ­0.00901  0.1316977  0.945 
Income  ­0.0031714  0.0286958  0.912    Income  0.0066668  0.028433  0.815 
Age  0.0142317  0.0036284  0.000    Age  0.00542  0.0033383  0.104 
Unemployed  0.0904591  0.1853456  0.626    Unemployed  0.0729799  0.182729  0.69 
Constant  ­3.241139  0.329129  0.000    Constant  ­1.359623  0.2911749  0.000 
 
 
               
Issue Organization Activity Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z|    Town Hall Meeting/Public Forum Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z| 
Benefit from Reform  0.5491698  0.1643082  0.001    Benefit from Reform  0.0193674  0.1440851  0.893 
Harm from Reform  0.5576906  0.1923656  0.004    Harm from Reform  0.2316689  0.1532456  0.131 
Democrat  0.5057512  0.1594493  0.002    Democrat  0.418123  0.1477087  0.005 
Republican  0.342031  0.1670298  0.041    Republican  0.1126088  0.1545077  0.466 
Education  0.2697638  0.0868342  0.002    Education  0.1170677  0.0725997  0.107 
Male  0.0174255  0.1298687  0.893    Male  ­0.1378909  0.1187293  0.245 
White  ­0.0367471  0.155768  0.814    White  0.379945  0.1439819  0.008 
Income  ­0.0250949  0.0324871  0.44    Income  ­0.0201316  0.0318734  0.528 
Age  0.0037099  0.004228  0.38    Age  ­0.0049076  0.003882  0.206 
Unemployed  0.0128596  0.243345  0.958    Unemployed  0.1763531  0.2105555  0.402 
Constant  ­2.78042  0.3469826  0.000    Constant  ­1.595089  0.3036141  0.000 
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Media Contact Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z|    Contribute Money Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z| 
Benefit from Reform  0.3794663  0.143982  0.008    Benefit from Reform  0.3431303  0.1496957  0.022 
Harm from Reform  0.3158309  0.1538236  0.04    Harm from Reform  0.3759828  0.1603384  0.019 
Democrat  0.1290779  0.1494501  0.388    Democrat  0.3347172  0.1599693  0.036 
Republican  0.3368183  0.1766667  0.057    Republican  0.2821876  0.1661786  0.089 
Education  0.2713288  0.0700447  0.000    Education  0.3278806  0.0739847  0.000 
Male  ­0.061518  0.1241664  0.62    Male  ­0.0657095  0.1252866  0.6 
White  ­0.0235693  0.1501288  0.875    White  0.1508651  0.1665601  0.365 
Income  ­0.0113726  0.0335609  0.735    Income  ­0.0605886  0.0354184  0.087 
Age  ­0.001783  0.0042786  0.677    Age  0.0045554  0.0042159  0.28 
Unemployed  ­0.3246346  0.2377821  0.172    Unemployed  0.0349101  0.2170649  0.872 
Constant  ­2.073385  0.3425408  0.000    Constant  ­2.569607  0.3869551  0.000 
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